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MINORITY PROTECTION IN RESIDENTIAL 
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS 
STEWART E. STERK* 
INTRODUCTION 
What services should government provide? How should they be fi-
nanced? What lifestyle restrictions should government impose? These 
questions often dominate the agenda in federal, state, and local politics, 
and the extensive media coverage they receive reflects that domination. 
Although less extensively reported, the same questions dominate the 
agendas of privately created residential governments-homeowner as-
sociations, condominium associations, and cooperative associations.1 
These governments affect the lives of the millions of Americans who live 
or do business in common interest communities.2 
Community association decisions, like other government decisions, oft-
en provoke sharp disagreement. Residents who fail to persuade the asso-
ciation's governing body sometimes look to courts for vindication. In this 
respect, these residents differ little from citizens and groups that are dis-
satisfied with decisions made by Congress or by state or municipal legisla-
tures. 
How and why democracy should be constrained to protect minorities-
those whose views have "lost" in the democratic process-has been a 
central focus of American constitutional scholarship. What is clear is that 
* Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author would 
like to thank David Carlson, Marci Hamilton, Wayne Hyatt, Melanie Leslie, John 
McGinnis, Debbie Paul, and Chuck Yablon for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Cities and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519 (1982), by Robert 
C. Ellickson, is the pioneering article recognizing the analogies-and differences-
between community associations and "public" governments. See also Wayne S. Hyatt 
& James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of 
Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (1976); 
Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey , 43 U . Cm. 
L. REV. 253 (1976) . 
2 As of 1992, 32,000,000 people lived in 150,000 community associations. See COM-
MUNITY Ass'Ns INST., COMMUNITY AssocIATIONS FACTBOOK 13 (Clifford J. Treese 
ed., 1993). Professor James Winokur has catalogued the explosion in litigation involv-
ing community associations and promissory servitudes, finding that the number of 
reported state appellate decisions on the subjects multiplied more than sevenfold be-
tween 1977 and 1982, and doubled again by 1987. See James L. Winokur, The Mixed 
Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual 
Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1, 63-64. 
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our constitutional scheme protects members of minority groups against 
untrammeled majority rule. To take two obvious examples, the First 
Amendment3 protects unpopular religious and political groups against 
majoritarian oppression, and the Takings Clause4 protects property own-
ers against legislation that would single them out for particularly unfavor-
able treatment. 
What implications does our discomfort with majoritarianism have for 
private residential governments? On one view, none. Because communi-
ty associations-unlike cities, states, and nations-are almost invariably 
formed with the unanimous consent of all members, dissident residents 
have no complaint if they dislike decisions reached in accordance with 
institutional arrangements to which they have explicitly agreed. On this 
view, when members of a community association contract to have dis-
putes resolved democratically, there is little reason for courts to interfere 
with the agreed upon process.5 
Although the contract argument against judicial intervention in com-
munity association decisions has considerable force, it is not a show-stop-
per. First, ·our legal regime does not sanction absolute freedom of con-
tract. Contract enforcement is the norm in our system, at least in part 
because enforcement simultaneously promotes personal autonomy, facili-
tates shifting of resources to higher-valuing users, and provides a basis, 
rooted in reciprocity, for reaching just results.6 But when particular con-
tracts, or particular categories of contract, do not advance the goals that 
underlie contract enforcement, doctrines often emerge to counteract the 
norm. The unconscionability doctrine in contract law7 and nonwaivable 
warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant law8 are prominent examples. 
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances."). 
4 Id. amend. V ("No ... private property [shall] be taken for public use, without 
just compensation."). 
5 See Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 922-
25 (1988) (arguing that courts should respect decision making structures created by 
unanimous private agreement, but conceding some room for judicial gap-filling). 
6 See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1823-48 (1991) 
(evaluating the arguments for enforceability based on principles of autonomy, social 
reciprocity, and efficiency and welfare enhancement). 
7 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1996) (providing that a court may refuse to enforce a con-
tract it considers to have been unconscionable at the time it was made); see also Ar-
thur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause , 115 U. PA. 
L. REv. 485, 485 (1967) (recounting the "misdrafting" of U.C.C. § 2-302 as "statutory 
pathology"). 
8 See generally Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties 
of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status , 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 95-
97 (1979) (noting the rise of the nonwaivable implied warranty of habitability) . 
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Second, and more important, all contracts require interpretation. In 
relational contracts intended to endure for a substantial period, parties 
rarely are able to anticipate and explicitly resolve all disputes that might 
arise. In the common interest community context, for instance, does a 
delegation of rulemaking power to an association include a delegation of 
power to require suits and ties in common areas, or to require residents 
to vote Democratic in municipal elections? Because parties to contracts 
rarely would confer unbridled power on contract partners, courts typical-
ly construe contracts to confine discretion, even when the contract itself 
includes no limiting language. The obligation to deal "in good faith" re-
flects this unwillingness to permit the exercise of unbridled power. 
The appropriate role of contract in allocating power between majority 
and minority has received considerable attention in the corporate litera-
ture.9 In publicly held . corporations, the majority of shareholders, 
through the management it selects, typically has broad discretion to act 
even in ways that displease minority shareholders. Discretion is not un-
limited, however; courts and commentators alike acknowledge that man-
agement may not simply shift wealth from some shareholders to others.10 
Unlike shareholders in public corporations, who generally are focused 
on a single goal-maximization of share price-community association 
residents tend to have varied concerns. Moreover, community associa-
tion residents typically hold less diversified portfolios than corporate 
shareholders. These differences counsel against transplanting rules from 
the corporate context to the community association context. 
The problems facing community association residents more closely re-
semble those confronting shareholders in closely held corporations, for 
whom share price is rarely a complete measure of investment value, and 
who, like community association residents, tend to have a substantial per-
centage of their assets tied up in a single investment. When closely held 
corporation disputes arise, at least some courts have been willing to pro-
tect minority shareholders against freeze-outs. The protection has not 
been indiscriminate; courts recognize that some business purposes can 
only be accomplished at some cost to minority shareholders. Moreover, 
courts afford protection to minority shareholders only against decline in 
9 Compare FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 234-36 (1991) (arguing that in the case of close cor-
porations, courts should enforce shareholder contracts about governance rules), with 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 1461, 
1466 (1989) (arguing that courts should be able to overrule bargains "when necessary 
to prevent opportunism and protect probable fair expectations"). 
10 Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 125 ("A requirement that all 
investors receive at least the market value of their positions prior to the transactions 
would be a useful rule of thumb for separating beneficial deals from potentially harm-
ful ones."). 
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market value, not loss of other benefits derived from the corporate asso-
ciation. 
Similarly, in the community association context, a regime that protect-
ed minority residents against all losses would result in organizational pa-
ralysis. Instead, analysis suggests-and case law generally supports-pro-
tection against redistribution of market value, but not against other 
harms suffered by unit owners. 
This Article explores. the appropriate limits on majority rule in commu-
nity associations. Part I provides an introduction to current law. Part II 
surveys the reasons for protecting minorities that have emerged in the 
public law literature. Part III establishes that contract law rarely leaves 
parties with unconstrained discretion, while Part IV outlines the limits 
corporate law imposes on majoritarian actions that adversely affect mi-
nority shareholders. Building on insights derived from other areas of law, 
Part V develops a model for minority protection in community associa-
tions. 
I. CoMMUNITY AssocIATION STRUCTURE 
A. Types of Community Associations 
Developers have used a varjety of legal frameworks to govern interde-
pendent communities. Many residential buildings, especially in New 
York City, are held in cooperative ownership. Individual residents do not 
"own" their apartments, but instead own shares in the cooperative corpo-
ration, which owns the building and issues a "proprietary lease" to each 
resident-shareholder's apartment. Elsewhere, condominium ownership is 
more prevalent.11 Moreover, many owners of detached single-family 
homes are bound together by servitudes which require them to maintain 
facilities shared by a group of neighbors.12 In recent years, the "common 
interest community" label has become used with increasing frequency to 
describe all arrangements in which unit owners are obligated to pay for 
common services or for maintenance of common facilities. 13 
11 The Community Associations Institute estimates that in 1990, there were 
4,847,921 condominium units in the United States and 824,000 cooperative units. See 
COMMUNITY Ass'Ns INST., supra note 2, at 13. 
12 Indeed, the Community Associations Institute estimates that as of 1990, 42% of 
community associations were condominiums, 7% were cooperatives, and the remain-
ing 51 % were other forms of planned communities. See id. 
13 See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES§ 6.2 (Preliminary Draft 
No. 12, Sept. 20, 1995): 
A common interest community is a real estate development or neighborhood in 
which the individually owned units, lots, or parcels are burdened by a servitude 
that imposes an obligation 
(a) to pay for the use of, or contribute to the maintenance of, property held or 
enjoyed in common by the owners of the individually owned property; or 
(b) to pay dues or assessments to an association that provides services or facili-
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Interdependence among neighbors is significantly greater in New York 
City cooperatives than it is in most suburban homeowner associations. 
As a result, New York co-op boards generally exert considerable influ-
ence, not only over matters of finance and design, but even over selection 
of apartment occupants. 14 By contrast, in some suburban homeowner as-
sociations, boards are responsible for maintenance of recreational facili-
ties, but little else. Condominium associations generally split the differ-
ence, with more extensive powers than suburban homeowner 
associations, but without power to veto prospective purchasers.15 
Despite the marked differences among common interest communities, 
a number of similarities emerge. In each form of common interest com-
munity, a community association enjoys a measure of financial control 
over residents. Community associations have some power to enforce 
lifestyle restrictions and to allocate benefits and burdens among members 
of the common interest community. These powers are generally grant-
ed-and often limited-by the documents governing the common inter-
est community. 
B. Governing Documents 
Most common interest communities are created by a single developer, 
not by agreement among neighboring landowners. Before a developer 
sells off any individual units in a common interest community, the devel-
oper typically drafts and records a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions" ("CC&Rs"), a "Declaration" ("Declaration") or 
"Master Deed" designed to bind each unit purchaser in the community.16 
The Declaration generally imposes use restrictions on unit owners and 
creates an association with power to levy assessments against the unit 
owners and to make rules. In addition, the Declaration typically provides 
for its own amendment.17 The developer also drafts bylaws for the asso-
ties to property held or enjoyed in common, or to the individually owned prop-
erty, or that enforces the servitudes burdening the property in the develop-
ment. 
The comment to the section notes that condominium and cooperative developments 
fall within the chapter's scope. See id.· § 6.2 cmt. 
14 See Michael Hinds, When a Co-op Rejects a Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1986, 
§ 8, at 1 (discussing notables rejected by cooperative boards). 
16 See generally Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and "Reasonableness" in 
Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 Ott10 ST. L.J. 
41, 47-48 (1990) (noting that the level of community association power tends to in-
crease as units become more interdependent). 
16 See generally WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER AssOCIA· 
TION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY Assoc1ATION LAW 355-62 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the 
theory and practice of drafting CC&Rs for community associations); see also Natel-
son, supra note 15, at 44-47 (discussing functions of property owners' associations). 
17 See HYATT, supra note 16, at 370-71 (providing a sample table of contents for a 
condominium declaration); id. at 373-77 (providing the same for a homeowner associ-
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ciation. These typically provide for a board of directors and for election 
of the board's members. The bylaws also define the scope of the board's 
power, and specify the procedures the board must follow in its rulemak-
ing and servitude enforcement capacities. In addition, bylaws typically 
include an amendment procedure.18 
Typically, the governing documents also include an initial set of rules 
for the development. Once the development becomes operational, the 
association's board may amend the rules, enact new ones, and levy assess-
ments on the unit owners. If a particular unit owner fails to comply with 
the board's rules or fails to pay assessments, the board may act, in accord-
ance with the bylaws, to enforce the rules or assessments. 
C. Source and Enforceability of Owner Obligations 
Within the structure of the common interest community, use restric-
tions and assessment obligations may emanate from several sources: the 
Declaration, association enactments or rules, or, less frequently, associa-
tion bylaws. Courts are far more likely to enforce use restrictions that 
appear in the recorded Declaration than they are to enforce restrictions 
imposed by subsequent vote of the association's board. This subpart ex-
plores the relationship between the source of a restriction and its judicial 
enforcement. 
1. Express Restrictions in the Declaration at the Time of Purchase 
A restriction included in a condominium Declaration or in a subdivi-
sion's CC&Rs looks much like a common law easement or covenant. By 
the terms of the restriction, each landowner makes an express promise, 
for the benefit of one or more neighbors, to take some action or to ab-
stain from taking some action. Although historically a variety of hoary 
requirements (including "touch or concern" and "privity of estate") im-
peded enforcement of such promises, those requirements increasingly 
have been relegated to the dustbin. Indeed, the current Restatement of 
ation). Frequently, statutes limit the amendment provisions a that Declaration may 
include. Thus, the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA] requires that, 
subject to narrowly defined exceptions, the Declaration governing a residential com-
munity may be amended "only by vote or agreement of unit owners of units to which 
at least 67% of the votes in the association are allocated, or any larger majority the 
declaration specifies." UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP Acr § 2-117(a) (1994). 
The UCIOA permits the Declaration to specify a smaller number "only if all of the 
units are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use." Id. Moreover, UCIOA § 2-
117(f) requires agreement of unit owners holding 80% of the votes in order to amend 
the Declaration to "prohibit or materially restrict the permitted uses of or behavior in 
a unit or the number or other qualifications of persons who may occupy units." 
18 See HYATT, supra note 16, at 371-73 (providing a sample table of contents for 
bylaws of condominium associations); id. at 377-78 (providing same for homeowner 
associations). 
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Property declares all servitudes to be valid unless they contravene consti-
tutional or statutory rights or violate public policy.19 
Since 1938, when the New York Court of Appeals decided Neponsit 
Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,20 American 
courts have, with increasing regularity, enforced covenants requiring pay-
ment of annual dues or assessments for the maintenance of common facil-
ities. 21 The few recent cases in which courts have refused to enforce as-
sessments generally have been cases in which unit owners challenged an 
assessment imposed by board action in a circumstance in which the Dec-
laration itself provided little guidance about the potential scope or size of 
the assessment.22 In other words, when the Declaration imposes a clear 
financial obligation on a unit owner, courts hold the unit owner to that 
obligation.23 Indeed, for condominium owners, the obligation to pay an-
nual assessments generally derives from statute.24 
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (Council Draft 
No. 2, 1990). 
20 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938). 
21 See, e.g., Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226, 1232 (Ill. 
1983) (upholding an assessment for recreational facilities as a binding covenant run-
ning with the land); Regency Homes Ass'n v. Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783, 793 (Neb. 
1993) (finding that an assessment for recreational facilities "touche[d] and con-
cern[d]" land and was therefore enforceable); Harbison Community Ass'n v. Mueller, 
459 S.E.2d 860, 861 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (finding enforceable an assessment for main-
tenance of common facilities); Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n v. Harris, 736 
S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex. 1987) (finding a covenant to pay an annual assessment to a 
homeowners' association enforceable as a lien superior to Texas homestead rights). 
22 See Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 283 A.2d 911, 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1971) (finding a covenant to pay dues to be too vague when no constraint existed on 
association's power to levy assessments); Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. 
Seifart, 269 S.E.2d 178, 184 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (finding a covenant to pay assess-
ments to be too indefinite to determine whether particular assessments were author-
ized); Ebbe v. Senior Estates Golf & Country Club, 657 P.2d 696, 697 (Or. Ct. App. 
1983) (refusing to enforce an initiation fee introduced in the bylaws of a country club 
when the Declaration mentioned no such fee but merely required owners to become 
members of the club). But see Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 248 S.E.2d 904, 909 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1978) (holding that a covenant to pay country club dues did not "touch and 
concern" the land and thus was not enforceable as a real covenant, even when the 
obligation to pay such dues was included in the Declaration). Raintree apparently is 
limited to dues for membership in off-premises country clubs. Thus, in Four Seasons 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Sellers, 302 S.E.2d 848 (N;C. Ct. App. 1983), the court, distin-
guishing Raintree, enforced a covenant for the maintenance of recreational facilities. 
See id. at 853. 
23 See generally Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1528-29 (arguing that courts should not 
evaluate the reasonableness of restrictions found in a Declaration). 
24 See generally UNIF. CoNDO. Acr § 3-115 (1977) (providing for annual assess-
ments for common expenses); id. § 3-116 (providing for lien for assessments). The 
UCIOA includes parallel provisions for all common interest communities, including 
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Similarly, courts typically have enforced use restrictions included in the 
Declaration, even against challenges that the restrictions inhibited free 
speech or undermined personal autonomy. They have almost invariably 
enforced Declaration provisions requiring unit owners to obtain approval 
from an architectural control committee before making specified im-
provements. 25 They have upheld Declaration restrictions against signs, 
despite free speech and antitrust challenges. 26 And, particularly in the 
both condominiums and single family home communities linked by a community asso-
ciation. See UNJF. CoMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP Acr §§ 3-115, 3-116 (1994). 
25 See, e.g., Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners' Ass'n v. Viewpoint 
Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 72 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding an association's right to 
enforce an architectural control covenant); Killearn Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Keever, 595 So. 2d 1019, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a covenant 
against installation of satellite dishes); Stone Hill Community Ass'n v. Norpel, 492 
N.W.2d 409, 410 (Iowa 1992) (per curiarn) (upholding against a resident's First 
Amendment challenge an association's ban of flags); Goode v. Village of Woodgreen 
Homeowners Ass'n, 662 So. 2d 1064, 1077 (Miss. 1995) (announcing a nearly absolute 
rule in favor of architectural approval covenants); Water's Edge on Saratoga Lake 
Homeowners' Ass'n v. Weissman, 614 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding 
in favor of an architectural committee and against homeowners who replaced their 
front doors without permission). 
To say that courts enforce covenants requiring approval by architectural control 
committees is not to say that courts abstain from reviewing decisions made by those 
committees. See, e.g., Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, 593 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1992) (finding a homeowners' association's architectural control covenant to be 
unreasonable); Indian Hills Club Homeowners Ass'n v. Cooper, No. 0lAOl-9507-CH-
00319, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 832, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1995) (concluding 
that a committee unreasonably exercised its power under an architectural control cov-
enant). 
Courts have also enforced explicit Declaration prohibitions against particular struc-
tures. See Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. "fydings, 883 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Wash. 
1994) (enforcing a prohibition on exterior antennas). But cf Portola Hills Communi-
ty Ass'n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to enforce a 
prohibition on satellite dishes when the proposed dish would be invisible from all 
adjoining property). The California Supreme Court later disapproved of the Portola 
Hills analysis in Nahrestedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 
(Cal. 1994) (en bane). 
26 See Fran Welch Real Estate Sales, Inc. v. Seabrook Island Co., 809 F.2d 1030, 
1033 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting an antitrust challenge to a restriction on "for sale" 
signs); Tansey-Warner, Inc. v. East Coast Resorts, Inc., No. 720, 1978 WL 22460, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1978) (rejecting a free speech challenge to a sign prohibition in a 
condominium Declaration); Knolls Ass'n v. Hinton, 389 N.E.2d 693,697 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1979) (enforcing a Declaration prohibition on signs); Murphy v. Timber Trace Ass'n, 
779 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. 1989) (rejecting free speech and antitrust challenges to a 
Declaration restriction on hours during which "for sale" signs could be posted); Harri-
son v. Tucker, 342 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. App. 1961) (enforcing a sign prohibition 
while refusing to enforce a racially restrictive covenant). No litigation appears to 
have arisen over a unit owner's posting of political signs in violation of a sign prohibi-
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case of condominium developments, courts have enforced Declaration re-
strictions prohibiting or restricting ownership of pets. 27 
Courts are less likely to enforce Declaration restrictions in one impor-
tant class of cases: those in which the restriction excludes some class of 
potential residents. Usually, statutes command that such restrictions not 
be enforced. The 1988 amendments to the federal Fair Housing Act pre-
clude enforcement of age restrictions, subject to a narrow exception for 
housing for the aged.28 Even in the absence of an express statute, courts 
have been reluctant to enforce restrictions that would, for example, ex-
clude group homes for physically or mentally disabled individuals. 29 
This dichotomy-between enforcement of non-exclusionary restric-
tions and non-enforcement of exclusionary restrictions-does not capture 
doctrine perfectly, but it comes close. Moreover, the dichotomy is consis-
tent with a vision of servitudes that emphasizes the fairness and efficiency 
of holding homeowners to their bargains. A homeowner who agrees, up-
on purchasing a home, to abide by express, easily discoverable restric-
tions should not be heard to complain when her neighbors seek to en-
force those restrictions against her. At the same time, the fact that the 
developer-whose primary interest lies in marketing the units-ip.cluded 
restrictions in the Declaration provides strong evidence that the develop-
tion in a common interest community's Declaration. However, the same contractual 
rationale for rejecting free speech arguments against prohibitions of commercial signs 
would also apply in the context of political signs. 
27 See Nahrestedt, 878 P.2d at 1277; Pines of Boca Barwood Condo. Ass'n v. Dean, 
605 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Granby Heights Ass'n v. Dean, 
647 N.E.2d 75, 77 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (relying on a statute in holding that an associ-
ation could not prohibit pets by rule, but indicating that such restrictions would be 
enforceable if contained in a master deed or bylaws). See generally Carl B. Kress, 
Comment, Beyond Nahrestedt: Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Property 
Owners Association, 42 UCLA L. REv. 837, 880-83 (1995) (suggesting that pet restric-
tions in Declarations should be routinely enforced). 
28 The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of "familial status" in the sale or rental of housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994). The 
statute was designed, in part, to prohibit discrimination against families with children, 
and the statute has been applied to preclude enforcement of age restrictions in restric-
tive covenants. See Lanier v. Fairfield Communities Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1533, 1537 
(M.D. Fla. 1990) (sustaining a challenge to a residential community's exclusion of 
persons under 18 because the community did not qualify as housing for older persons 
under the Fair Housing Act). The statute does provide a narrow exception for provid-
ers of "housing for older persons." See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1994); see also Massaro 
v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, 796 F. Supp. 1499, 1503-06 (S.D. Fla. 1992) 
(applying the exception to a residential subdivision). Of course, even before the 1988 
amendments, it was clear that racial restrictions were unenforceable. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604 (enacted 1968). 
29 See, e.g., Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 
460 N.E.2d 1336, 1337 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that public policy prevented enforcement 
of a restrictive covenant excluding homes for the mentally retarded). 
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er believed that the community as a whole would be more valuable with 
the restrictions than without. If the developer's surmise turns out to be 
wrong, and a restriction makes the units less attractive to potential pur-
chasers, the developer will have to pay for the mistake in the form of 
reduced purchase prices for the units. Market forces would then discour-
age other developers from repeating the mistakes of their prede<;essors. 
By contrast, the terms of an agreement between developer and home-
owners, however bargained for by the parties, provide no answer to 
claims of unfairness by third parties excluded from the development.30 
2. Restrictions Created by Declaration or Bylaw Amendment, or by 
Board Action 
The contract argument for enforcing a Declaration's non-exclusionary 
servitudes could, of course, be extended to all non-exclusionary servi-
tudes-even those enacted after the homeowner purchases his unit. 
When a homeowner buys a unit in a common interest community, the 
homeowner buys not only subject to express restrictions in the Declara-
tion, but also subject to the Declaration's provisions for amendment and 
to the creation and operation of a community association. Urider the 
contract theory, the homeowner should not be heard to complairi when, 
as anticipated by the documents, the association imposes a new restric-
tion by amending the Declaration, by amending its bylaws, or by ordinary 
board action.31 To the extent the homeowner has agreed to submit to the 
association's "jurisdiction," one might argue, the association's determina-
tion should be final. Yet, matters are not so simple. 
a. Disputes about the Scope of Association Power 
Even when the Declaration confers rulemaking power on the associa-
tion,32 courts have invalidated association rules by finding them inconsis-
tent with the Declaration's CC&Rs.33 Indeed, in those jurisdictions 
where it has been adopted, the Uniform Common Interest Ownership 
Act ("UCIOA") expressly limits an association's power, absent express 
authorization in the Declaration, to regulate "use of or behavior in" indi-
30 Similarly, the fact that all homeowners agreed to the restrictions provides less 
compelling evidence that the restrictions are efficient if the restrictions generate nega-
tive externalities. 
31 Indeed, in many jurisdictions, statutes limit the power of associations to amend 
their Declarations, often requiring a supermajority for amendment. Cf UNIF. CoM-
MON INTEREST OWNERSHIP Acr § 2-117(a) (1994) (requiring a 67% vote). 
32 Cf REsTA TEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.4 (Preliminary Draft 
No. 12, Sept. 20, 1995) (taking an expansive view of community association powers). 
33 See Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass'n, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237, 237 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992); Mohnani v. La Cancha Condo. Ass'n, 590 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991); Parkway Gardens Condo. Ass'n v. Kinser, 536 So. 2d 1076, 1076 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1988). . 
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victual residential units. 34 
At the same time, courts in other cases have sustained association pow-
er to levy assessments beyond those authorized in the Declaration. For 
instance, in Lake Tishimongo Property Owners Ass'n v. Cronin,35 cove-
nants limited annual assessments in a lake community to fifty-five cents 
per lake-front foot. An accumulation of sediments caused a majority of 
owners to support a one-time special assessment of $2.60 per front foot to 
pay for dredging the lake. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the spe-
cial assessment against the challenges of the minority, citing the necessity 
of the dredging operation.36 And, in Meadow Run & Mt. Lake Park 
Ass'n v. Berkel,37 a Pennsylvania court authorized an association to levy 
an assessment for repair of dams and roads, even though no deed cove-
nant authorized the assessment. 
Neither the cases requiring express authorization in the Declaration for 
an association's actions nor those cases permitting an association to exer-
cise powers beyond those granted to it are inconsistent with the contract 
argument for enforcing newly created servitudes. Instead, courts in these 
cases purport to engage in a form of contract construction. When courts 
or legislatures limit association power to act, they surmise that the parties 
did not ,intend to confer broad authority on the association. When courts 
permit association action in the absence of express authorization, or even 
in direct conflict with express deed limitations, they conclude that the 
parties surely would have intended that the association be empowered to 
act.38 
34 See UNIF. CoMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP Acr § 3-102(c). Moreover, the 
UCIOA permits amendment of the Declaration to restrict permitted uses of or behav-
ior in individual units only upon 80% approval. See id. § 2-117(f); cf. Township III 
Condo. Ass'n v. Mulligan, No. CV 92 50183 S, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 749, at *8, *9 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 1995) (finding that a condominium board could not, by 
rule, prohibit use of washers and dryers within a condominium unit; such use restric-
tions must have been incorporated into the Declaration or bylaws); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.7(4) (Preliminary Draft No. 12, Sept. 20, 
1995). 
35 679 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1984) (en bane). 
36 According to the court, 163 property owners, representing 1,976 votes, voted for 
the assessment, while 83 property owners, representing 928 votes, voted against the 
assessment. See id. at 854. In upholding the special assessment, the court concluded 
that the operations were: 
both reasonable and necessary for the preservation of the property value of the 
more than 900 lots in the subdivision. Under the unique circumstances attending 
this case, our sense of fairness and justice compels us to enforce the clear equita-
ble obligation of appellants to bear their share of the costs necessary for preserv-
ing the common property essential for continuation of the subdivision. 
Id. at 857. 
37 598 A.2d 1024, 1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
38 See, e.g., id. at 1026. As the Meadow Run court observed: 
This deed, while making no mention of an assessment, does put appellants on 
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When questions arise about the association's power to enact rules, the 
association often can avoid arguments about construction of the Declara-
tion by amending the Declaration itself. Even that tactic, however, raises 
some construction questions.39 
b. Disputes about Association Actions when the Association's 
Authority to Act is not Challenged 
Even if a dissident unit owner does not question community associa-
tion power to regulate on a particular issue, the owner may challenge a 
particular regulation. Courts do not simply dismiss such challenges by 
concluding that homeowners, who accepted the terms of association gov-
ernance when purchasing the unit, have no cause to complain about dem-
ocratically chosen association policies. Rather, courts examine the associ-
ation's actions. They do not engage in de novo review of the wisdom of 
the association's action,40 but instead ask whether the board's action was 
"reasonable"41 or examine whether the association made a plausible 
notice that should an association of lot owners be formed in the future, they 
would be bound by any rules the association adopted concerning usage of devel-
opment facilities. Implied in the existence of rules and regulations concerning 
usage of the facilities is the necessity for rules and regulations concerning mainte-
nance of these facilities. 
Id. 
Moreover, in construing the original contract among unit owners, courts tend to 
exalt their own independent judgment over the judgment of the majority of unit own-
ers. Even in those cases, like Lake Tishimongo and Meadow Run, in which courts 
sustain actions taken by an association's majority, the opinions are ·more concerned 
with establishing the necessity of the association's action than with paying homage to 
majority rule. And in other cases involving construction of Declaration language, 
courts evidence no tendency to defer to associations. For example, in Lake St. Louis 
Community Ass'n v. Leidy, 672 S.W.2d 381, 382, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), the court 
concluded that an association could not enjoin a landowner from parking an "eight-
een-foot long Ford Holiday Ramblette Mini Motor Home" pursuant to a covenant 
prohibiting parking of "trucks or commercial vehicles, boats, house trailers, boat trail-
ers, and trailers of every other description." See also Krein v. Smith, 807 P.2d 906,907 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (construing a covenant prohibiting parking of "[b]oats, camp-
ers, vacation trailers, and so on" to cover motor homes, but treating the question as 
one of law). 
39 See Lakeland Property Owners Ass'n v. Larson, 459 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1984) (holding that when a Declaration imposed covenants and provided for 
amendment of the covenants, the Declaration's amendment procedures could not be 
used to impose new covenants on community homeowners); Boyles v. Hausman, 517 
N.W.2d 610,616 (Neb. 1994) (finding that, while an association majority could change 
an existing covenant, it could not add a new one). 
4° Cf. Bennett v. Huwar, 748 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing trial 
court for giving lot owners a de novo hearing on a request for architectural approval). 
41 See, e.g., O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condo. Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813, 818-19 
(Alaska 1988) (sustaining as reasonable a blanket prohibition on exterior television 
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"business judgment. "42 
More often than not, the association's action ultimately is sustained. 
But, of course, any scrutiny of association action increases litigation costs, 
especially because not all cases are resolved on summary judgment mo-
tions. 43 Moreover, in a significant number of cases, the association loses, 
the court concluding that the association has acted unreasonably and that 
its action should be invalidated. 
For instance, community associations frequently impose restrictions on 
the renting of individual units. Resident owners often object, for one rea-
son or another,44 to the presence of transients within the community.45 
At the same time, even resident owners recognize that at some time in 
the future they might need to rent out their own units. Because blanket 
prohibitions on renting often are unpopular, community associations de-
velop compromise solutions. In Graham v. Board of Directors of River-
edge Village Condominium Ass'n,46 the court invalidated one such com-
promise as unreasonable. The association required that all rentals be for 
at least one month, and it doubled the $100 monthly maintenance .assess-
antennas); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 147 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1981) (invalidating as unreasonable an association's denial of consent to transfer 
unit to four owners, each of whom would enjoy use rights for 13 weeks); Unit Owners 
Ass'n of Buildamerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378, 385 (Va. 1982) (adopting a "rea-
sonableness" standard for review of amendments to condominium rules and regula-
tions). See generally Natelson, supra note 15, at 43-44 (noting that courts employ the 
reasonableness standard to construct a hypothetical bargain between the parties). 
42 See, e.g., Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316,317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) (apply-
ing the business judgment rule to the conduct of an association board); Levandusky v. 
One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321-22 (N.Y.1990) (invoking the 
business judgment rule to reject a unit owner's challenge to co-op board action); 
Schwarzmann v. Association of Apartment Owners, 655 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1982) (applying the business judgment rule to the conduct of an association 
board). See generally Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Note, Community Association Use Restric-
tions: Applying the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 653, 664-69 
(1988) ( discussing courts' use of the business judgment rule to review board enforce-
ment of use restrictions). 
43 See, e.g., Lyman v. Boonin, 635 A.2d 1029, 1032-33 (Pa. 1993) (refusing to grant 
summary judgment in dispute over association's parking policy); Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 
at 752 (refusing to grant summary judgment in a dispute over restrictions on trucks). 
44 The two most common objections to transient occupants are: (1) financing for 
individual units is often difficult to obtain unless the development is substantially 
owner-occupied; and (2) renters, compared with owner-occupants, may have less in-
centive to observe association rules and to maintain the premises. See generally HY-
ATT, supra note 16, at 305-07 (describing restraints on the sale, lease, and occupancy 
of units within an association). 
45 Cf Laguna Royale, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (invalidating an association's refusal to 
consent to transfer a unit to four separate time-share owners). 
46 No. 03A01-9404-CH-00137, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 
1994). 
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ment for any month during which a unit was rented. The court, in con-
cluding that the restriction was unreasonable, noted that the condomini-
ums were located in a tourist area catering to short-term vacationers.47 
Community associations often find it necessary to allocate benefits and 
burdens on some basis, and disaffected unit owners sometimes have been 
successful in challenging those allocations. Ridgely Condominium Ass'n 
v. Smyrnioudis48 furnishes a recent example. In a mixed-use condomini-
um comprising 225 residential units and seven commercial units, the asso-
ciation enacted a bylaw banning access to the 
I 
commercial units through 
the interior lobby, requiring access through the exterior entrances. 
Although the bylaw was enacted in response to security colJ_cerns, the 
court concluded that the bylaw was nevertheless unreasonable in light of 
the investments the commercial owners had made in their units. 
Perhaps the largest class of cases in which courts have intervened to 
overturn community association actions involves challenges to architec-
tural controJ committee decisions. Courts have refused to enforce design 
control decisions on the ground that either the committee could not artic-
ulate a sufficiently concrete standard for its decision,49 or, even when the 
committee was entirely clear about the criteria it imposed, simply because 
the court deemed the committee's decision to be "unreasonable."50 
c. Swhmary 
Even when the Declaration confers broad powers on the association, 
courts have intervened to overturn· association decisions by concluding 
that the Declaration gave only limited powers to the association or that 
the association's action was "unreasonable." As a matter of interpreting 
the bargain homeowners make when they purchase their units, neither 
justification for judicial intervention is implausible. Few homeowners 
would believe that when purchasing their homes they surrendered unlim-
47 The court also indicated that the master deed did not confer on the association 
the power to regulate rentals, despite a provision stating that "[a]ny lease or rental 
agreement must be in writing and subject to the requirements and provisions of this 
Master Deed and the Association." Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 
48 660 A.2d 942, 950-51 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995). 
49 See, e.g., Young v. Tortoise Island Homeowners Ass'n, 511 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (overturning an association's disapproval of a building plan in-
volving a flat roof, finding that review board's power to pass on aesthetics, harmony, 
and balance was deemed too personal and vague); Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. 
Slater, 740 P.2d 668,671 (Mont. 1987) (overturning a rejection of plans when commit-
tee could not articulate a design standard). 
50 See, e.g., Kies v. Hollub, 450 So. 2d 251, 255-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (re-
jecting as unreasonable an association's disapproval of light poles on a tennis court); 
Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, 593 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding 
unreasonable a blanket prohibition on above-ground pools); Chesapeake Estates Im-
provement Ass'n v. Foster, 288 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Md. 1972) (finding unreasonable a 
ban on factory-built homes). 
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ited authority over their lives to a community association, and few would 
believe that they ceded to the association the power to act unreasonably. 
At the same time, neither justification is long on content. The scope of 
association power may not be unlimited, but how do we decide what that 
scope is? Why are courts better situated to make that decision than the 
majority of homeowners as represented by their association? What 
makes particular rules supported by a majority of homeowners unreason-
able, other than a court's conviction that the rule ought not be enforced? 
Answering these questions requires an understanding of the potential 
evils of majority rule. 
II. MAJORITY RULE AND ITS LIMITS 
}\... Why Majority Rule? 
Much of our legal system-both public and private-is based on the 
assumption that collective decisions should be made by majority vote. 
All citizens are entitled to vote for a variety of public officials, and those 
elections are decided in favor of the candidates who garner the most 
votes. Similarly, when public issues are decided by referenda, the fate of 
the proposition is decided by majority vote. Within representative bod-
ies, too, most issues are decided by majority vote. Even in government 
institutions supposedly more insulated from democratic processes-ap-
pellate courts, for example-decisions are made by majority vote. 
The majority rule principle is not limited to government institutions. 
Corporate decisions, too, are generally decided by majority vote, whether 
that of shareholders or directors.51 And majority rule is the organizing 
principle for decision making in many other private organizations. 52 
The natural question is why we should look to majority rule as a basis 
for making important social decisions. Few of us believe that important 
scientific questions should be resolved by majority rule. 53 If 51 % of the 
members of a calculus class concluded that the derivative of 3x2 was 5x, 
should they be entitled to have that answer marked correct on an exami-
nation? Fewer still believe that religi,ous truth can or should be deter-
51 When corporate shareholders vote, success requires assent of a majority of 
shares voted, not a majority of shareholders. This difference makes inapplicable some 
justifications for majority rule, while enhancing the power of others. 
52 See, e.g., MAJOR HENRY M. RoBERT, RoBERT's RuLES OF ORDER § 6 (Patnode 
ed., 1989) (stating that a main motion normally requires a majority vote). 
53 Within the judicial decision making process, what counts as admissible scientific 
evidence is a matter.of considerable controversy. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. 
Corp., 509 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1993) (noting controversy over whether the newly elabo-
rated standard would permit fringe scientific theories to have inappropriate influence 
over courts); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case? The Admissibility 
of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1779, 1780 
(1995) (noting the controversy that the Daubert opinion has engendered). 
288 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:273 
mined by majority vote. Yet, we continue to rely on majority rule to 
make determinations of political and financial significance. Why? 
One answer stems from the premise that every member of a collective 
body should share equally in political power.54 If less than a majority 
could bind the whole to act, proponents of action each would wield more 
political power than a larger body of opponents. Conversely, if action 
required a supermajority, opponents ofan action each would enjoy more 
power than any individual proponent. Only majority rule preserves 
equality among all members of the group. 
The premise that political power should. be equally distributed is cen-
tral to prominent, if controversial, justifications for judicial review of leg-
islative action. In particular, John Hart Ely has argued that courts should, 
as a matter of constitutional law, protect those most likely to be excluded 
from political power in a majoritarian regime.55 Indeed, even those who 
question process-based theories of judicial review often start from the 
premise that political power should be distributed equally.56 
Equal distribution of political power cannot, however, serve as an ab-
solute principle. The principle is incoherent without some delineation of 
the political realm. Not all decisions can be treated as political decisions 
over which all members of the collective body have an equal say. Voting 
rights provide the most extreme example. If we treat voting rights as a 
political issue to be decided by majority rule, a majority would be em-
powered to disenfranchise members of the collective body. Such disen-
franchisement would clearly violate the principle that political power be 
distributed equally. 
To make the equal distribution principle coherent, the principle itself 
must be subject to limits. To identify those limits, one must start by iden-
tifying reasons for distributing power equally (and, derivatively, for al-
lowing majorities to rule). One reason is that sharing political power in-
creases the power of individuals to shape their own lives in a society 
marked by state regulation.57 Another is that giving each citizen an equal 
say in governmental decision making processes may also promote self-
54 See J. ROLAND PENNOCK, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ITs MERITS AND PROSPECTS 
112-15 (1950) (offering arguments for equality of political power). 
55 See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-100 (1980) (advancing a 
process-based representation-reinforcement theory of minority protection); see also 
JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 71-72 
(1980); LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 131, 138-39 (1975). 
56 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 675-78 (arguing that inequality of resources creates a sub-
stantial bias in the functioning of majoritarian institutions, and suggesting that consti-
tutionalization of a form of welfare rights would better equalize political power). 
57 See PENNOCK, supra note 54, at 105 ("[I]nsofar as individual liberty must be 
regulated by government, the only way we can achieve this self-determination is by 
sharing in political power."). 
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respect among the citizenry.58 To the extent society deems an individual 
unworthy of an equal role in making critical decisions, the individual may 
question his own worth. 59 
These reasons for distributing power equally are peculiar to notions of 
citizenship in a coercive state, but less persuasive in the context of a vol-
untary association. Concerns about self-determination are less critical in 
voluntary organizations, because the choice to join-or to leave-gives 
an individual a measure of control, even if the individual has no "voice" 
in the organization's decision making process.6° Concerns about promot-
ing self-respect, too, appear less significant in voluntary organizations, be-
cause the individual can choose not to participate in an organization 
whose governing rules are offensive. 
Other reasons for equal distribution of power, and hence for majority 
rule, translate more easily from the public to the private sphere. In par-
ticular, majority rule in any sphere can be viewed as a form of applied 
utilitarianism, likely to produce better outcomes than other decision mak-
ing processes.61 Since each individual typically is the best respecter of his 
own interests, a decision making system will produce better outcomes if 
participation is open to all individuals with a stake than if power is di-
58 See id. at 107 ("Self-respect ... is dependent upon the possession of political 
power."). 
59 See id. at 108 ( describing the negative impact that the deprivation of political 
power has on the individual). 
6° For the classic work comparing "exit''. and "voice" as mechanisms for influenc-
ing organizational outcomes, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYAL-
TY 40-41 (1970). Professor Gregory Alexander has suggested that lumping all "volun-
tary" organizations together and treating them under the same legal rubric is a 
mistake. Alexander distinguishes between voluntary associations formed for instru-
mental ends and "communities ... drawn together by shared visions that constitute 
for each of them their personal identity." Gregory S. Alexander, Group Autonomy: 
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 26 (1989). Alexan-
der uses tp.e monastery as an example of an organization in ,which membership is 
essentialto the realization of self-identity. See id. at 27. Alexander also suggests that 
homeowner associations have community elements and should not be treated simply 
as groups created by contract. See id. at 42. And, indeed, once a homeowner be-
comes a member of an association, she does, in many ways, become bound up with 
the group. "Exit" becomes difficult. See infra Part III. Nevertheless, with a commu-
nity association, unlike a monastery, it is difficult to see how the initial decision to join 
could be a decision largely outside of the homeowner's control. 
61 Ely has written: 
It is possible to assert, I suppose, that the best way to find out what makes the 
most people happy is to appoint someone to make an estimate, but no one could 
really buy this idea. The more sensible way, quite obviously, is to let everyone 
register her own preference .... Thus democracy is a sort of applied utilitarianism 
John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 
399, 407 (1978). 
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vorced from interest.62 
Indeed, if we assume that each member of the collective has an identi-
cal interest in the group's decision, the utility of majority rule flows sys-
tematically from the premise-essential to a market system-that, on av-
erage, each individual makes decisions that advance his own interests.63 
The premise, put in other terms, is that when faced with a binary decision, 
the individual makes the "right" decision about his interests more than 
50% of the time. If this premise is correct, it follows that a decision fa-
vored by a majority of any group with identical interests is more likely to 
be the right decision for the group than that favored by the minority.64 
And, as the probability that individuals make right decisions about their 
own interest increases, the probability that majority vote will yield "right" 
decisions also increases.65 · 
When members of the collective have an unequal stake in the collec-
tive's decisions, the costs of gathering information suggest that weighing 
votes by stake will generate better outcomes. Members with the greatest 
stake have the greatest incentive to invest resources in acquiring informa-
tion about the wisdom of alternative courses of action. Assuming infor-
mation contributes positively to the quality of decisions, those mell}.bers 
with a greater stake are, therefore, likely to make better decisions. On 
this theory, rules like "one share, one vote" are more likely to generate 
optimal outcomes than rules like "one shareholder, one vote."66 
Finally, equal distribution of power among members of a collective 
body may create a tighter sense of community among members of the 
62 See PENNOCK, supra note 54, at 108 (arguing that each person should be the 
judge of what gives him satisfaction and should have the power to effectuate that 
judgment). 
63 This premise derives from the basic analytical tool of economists: "the assump-
tion that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions." RICHARD A. PosNER, 
THE EcoNOMics OF JusncE 1 (1981). If, on average, individuals made decisions that 
left them worse off, market transactions would shift resources to lower-valuing users, 
and would thereby decrease social welfare. 
64 For more extensive development, see Shmuel Nitzan & Uriel Procaccia, Optimal 
Voting Procedures for Profit Maximizing Firms, 51 PuB. CHOICE 191, 198-203 (1986) 
(comparing the efficacy of corporate voting procedures), and Zohar Goshen, From 
Dictatorship to Democracy: A Study of Strategic Voting in Corporate Law (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author). See also KENNETH J. ARROW, SocIAL CHOICE 
AND JusncE 167-69 (1983) (arguing that majority voting is a satisfactory social choice 
mechanism if done under conditions of neutrality, anonymity, independence from ir-
relevant alternatives, and positive response). 
65 Cf. JoHN RAwLS, ATHEORY .OF JusTICE 358 (1971): 
The suggestion goes back to Condorcet that if the likelihood of a correct judgment on 
the part of the representative legislator is greater than that of an incorrect one, the 
probability that the majority vote is correct increases as the likelihood of a correct 
decision by the representative legislator increases. 
66 See generally Goshen, supra note 64, at 6 n.6. 
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collective, causing each member to take better account of the interests of 
the others.67 To the extent that this sort of community increases individu-
al happiness and improves the quality of decision making, these benefits 
should be capable of realization in a privately created collective body. 
Thus, the case for majority rule is a substantial one. At the same time, 
as we have already seen, majority rule can never be an absolute principle. 
What remains for the next subpart is an exploration of the reasons for 
limiting majority rule. 
B. Limits on Majority Rule 
1. Protecting Fundamental Rights 
The argument that majorities ought not be permitted to abridge funda-
mental rights has become a staple in American constitutional theory. 68 
The argument rests on the simple premise that majority rule is not an end 
in itself, but a means of assuring that government respects personal liber-
ties and promotes social welfare. 69 If one views liberty of conscience, a 
measure of personal autonomy, or even security from economic preda-
tion as more essential to a liberal society than political liberty, one would 
support constraining the power of political majorities when these critical 
interests are at stake.70 Moreover, if majority rule is designed to foster 
equal input into the political process, it is self-evident that majorities 
should not be permitted to entrench their own powers by limiting the 
67 See PENNOCK, supra note 54, at 106-07 (arguing that shared political power cre-
ates the. conditions for a cohesive community). 
68 See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, A Theory of Free Speech, 34 UCLA L. REv.1837, 
1877 (1987) (arguing that the inalienable right of conscience cannot be surrendered to 
the state); Mark V. Tushnet, Foreword, Symposium on Democracy and Distrust: Ten 
Years Later, 77 VA. L. REv. 631, 634 (1991) (identifying the rights-based approach 
with Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade, and treating it as one of the major 
currents in contemporary constitutional theory). 
69 See RAWLS, supra note 65, at 229-30: 
One of the tenets of classical liberalism is that the political liberties are of less 
intrinsic importance than liberty of conscience and freedom of the person. 
Should one be forced to choose between the political liberties and all the others, 
the governance of a good sovereign who recognized the latter and who upheld 
the rule of law would be far preferable. On this view, the chief merit of the 
principle of participation is to insure that the government respects the rights and 
welfare of the governed. 
7° For the position that liberty of conscience merits protection against majority 
rule, see KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE UsEs OF LANGUAGE 177-79 
(1989) (enunciating a broad view of the protection of political expression), and David 
A.J. Richards, A New Paradigm for Free Speech Scholarship, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 
275 (1990) ("Constitutionally legitimate political power must respect substantive 
spheres of moral independence-like liberty of conscience."). For the argument that 
economic interests merit protection against majority rule, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 308 (1985). 
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franchise.71 
Rights theorists, however, face a critical hurdle: if not by majority rule, 
how does the society determine which rights merit protection against 
majoritarian depredation? Our legal system entrusts judges with the 
power to decide which rights to protect; how they should exercise that 
power remains a matter of considerable controversy. Cass Sunstein, 
among others, has suggested that judges use their deliberative faculties to 
determine appropriate limits on majority rule.72 Michael Perry has sug-
gested that courts look to moral consensus as a basis for defining rights 
against the majority.73 Ultimately, however, our legal system finds it crit-
ical to locate limits on majority rule in the Constitution itself, however 
that document is interpreted. 74 The Constitution commands respect in 
part because of its status as a contract ratified by each of the sovereign 
states 75 and in part out of recognition that the Founders themselves, re-
moved from the heat of battle over particular issues that have.since aris-
en, were well positioned to set ground rules for the majority's exercise of 
power.76 
71 See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1326, 1339 (1994) (discussing the potential for the majority to entrench itself 
by withdrawing the minority's right to vote). 
72 See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to 
Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HAsTINGS 
L.J. 957, 976-77 (1979) (suggesting that courts should adhere to constraining moral 
principles); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38,STAN. L. REv. 
29, 65 (1985) (stating that judge-made law averts the danger of faction formation). 
73 See Michael Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional 
Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 280-81, 295-96 (1981). 
74 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-86 (1965) (finding a consti-
tutional right of privacy in penumbras emanating from explicit constitutional protec-
tions). · 
75 The unanimous consent of the original states mitigates the philosophical difficul-
ty of why the Constitution should be entitled to any more respect than any other set 
of rules adopted by a majority over the objections of the minority. But cf Bruce 
Ackerman & Neil Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 475, 
478-79 (1995) (noting that the ratification process itself violated the terms of the Arti-
cles of Confederation and detailing irregularities in the ratification process). Histori-
cally, philosophers have looked at the "social contract" as a justification fo.r govern-
ment. John Rawls, with his attempt to ground his "just" system on the consent of 
disembodied individuals acting under a "veil of ignorance," continues this tradition of 
defining a just system by reference to a hypothetical contract which has attained 
unanimous consent. See RAWLS, supra note 65, at 136-42. As David Carlson has not-
ed, however, "[i]n the Rawlsian model, all people are so completely stripped down 
that they are precisely alike; a 'bargain,' strictly speaking, is not required." David 
Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 M1CH. L. REv. 1341, 1343 (1986). 
76 See Schauer, supra note 71, at 1337 (noting that constitutionalization is "pre-
Inised on the view that decision making about issues of continuing importance can 
sometimes be improved by removing from the phenomenological foreground the 
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However powerful rights theory is as a basis for judicial review of legis-
lative decisions, it furnishes little justification for overturning decisions of 
the majority of a homeowners' association or condominium board. Most 
of the issues that arise in these contexts are not the sort that one would 
consider fundamental to the existence of a liberal society.77 Consider, 
however, those issues that some might deem fundamental: restrictions on 
signs or other expressive activity, for example.78 Existing constitutional 
jurisprudence permits individuals to execute limited waivers even of First 
Amendment rights. Thus, although government may not unduly limit the 
speech rights of employees, no comparable limitation applies in the ab-
sence of state action; private employers, and presumably other private 
entities, are free to restrict the speech of employees. 79 If a private entity 
can condition one's livelihood on suppression of speech, there seems to 
be little reason to _prevent a homeowners' association from demanding 
that its residents obey duly enacted speech restrictions. 80 
most immediate implications of those decisions"). See generally JAMES BucHANAN & 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 79-80 (1962) (analogizing to agree-
ments about the rules of a game before, rather than after, the game starts). 
77 Parking restrictions, satellite dish prohibitions, and assessment levels, for in-
stance, would appear to abridge "fundamental" rights only to property absolutists-
the very people most likely to advocate enforcement of contractual arrangements. 
Compare, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 306-31 (advocating protection of economic 
interests against majority rule), with Epstein, supra note 5, at 924-25 (advocating rou-
tine enforcement of privately created servitudes when majority-rule procedures are in 
effect). 
78 A few states have held, as a matter of state constitutional law, that certain pri-
vate property owners (shopping center owners) may not prohibit expressive activity 
on their property. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76, 79 (1980} 
(affirming, against Takings and Due Process challenges, a California court's holding 
that the state constitution required a shopping center owner to permit speech and 
petitioning); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 590 (Mass. 1983} 
(holding that, under the Massachusetts Constitution, a person may solicit public office 
nomination signatures in the mall area of a privately owned shopping center); Alder-
wood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 117 (Wash. 1981) (holding 
that Washington law permitted the solicitation· of signatures at privately owned shop-
ping centers). The United States Supreme Court has held, as a matter of federal con-
stitutional law, that a shopping center owner is free to restrict expressive activity. See 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (denying right to picket); Lloyd Corp. 
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 552, 570 (1972} (denying right to distribute handbills). 
79 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 834, 836-37 (1982) (holding that a 
private school could fire employees without concern for constitutional claims that 
such firings inhibited free speech). 
80 The same arguments apply to restrictions on religion, for instance, or to restric-
tions on economic harm. In each case, a potential homeowner might choose to 
purchase in a community that protects her against unwanted restrictions. If, however, 
she chooses to purchase in a community that restricts religious practice or threatens 
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2. Promoting Deliberation 
Civic republican scholars-particularly Frank Michelman and Cass 
Sunstein-have justified judicial review on the ground that legislative ac-
tions are too often the product of dealmaking and too rarely the product 
of deliberation.81 Civic republicans reject the pluralist notion that polit-
ical processes are designed to aggregate the preferences of individ~al citi-
zens, contending instead that legislation should be the product of a pro-
cess that emphasizes deliberation about the whidom of alternative 
policies.82 To inject more deliberation into the political processes, civic 
republicans support rules and doctrines that would require the process to 
incorporate a deliberative component,83 as well as the increased use of 
courts· (which may be institutionally better suited for deliberation) to re-
view legislative decisions. 84 
Civic republicans value deliberation for its transformative promise. In 
their view, political discussion can generate in citizens a set of preferences 
both different, and apparently more accurate, than the preferences those 
same citizens had before engaging in collective dialogue.85 On this theo-
particular economic harms, she might be treated as waiving any constitutional protec-
tions she might otherwise have had. 
81 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces 
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 74 (1986) ("Unable as a nation to practice 
our own self-government (in the full, positive sense), we-or at any rate we of 'the 
reasoning class'-can at least identify with the judiciary's as we idealistically construct 
it."); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1579 (1988) 
(stating that the requirement that statutes be rational to pass judicial scrutiny "is best 
understood as a requirement of deliberation by political officials"). 
82 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1544: 
Under republican approaches to politics, laws must be supported by argument 
and reasons; they cannot simply be fought for or be the product of self-interested 
'deals.' Private-regarding reasons are an insufficient basis for legislation. Polit-
ical actors must justify their choices by appealing to a broader public good. 
83 See id. at 1576-78 (endorsing campaign finance reform as an effort to promote 
deliberation in the legislative process); id. at 1581 (arguing that "one of the tasks of 
statutory construction is to promote actual deliberation in the lawmaking process and 
to interpret statutes, within the appropriate confines of the judicial role, so as to mini-
mize the pathologies of pluralism"); id. at 1582-89 ( cataloguing rules of statutory con-
struction designed to minimize those "pathologies"). 
84 See Michelman, supra note 81, at 75-77 (describing the suitability of courts, and 
especially multi-judge appellate courts, for engaging in deliberative processes). 
85 See id. at 27 ("Any view in which the true, primary interests of individuals are 
'exogenous' or prior to-politics is unrepublican. Republicanism rejects the idea that 
political activity is, at best, a mere means to the advancement of those prior interests 
.... "). Sunstein echoes the same theme: "The republican position is ... that existing 
desires should be revisable in light of collective discussion and debate, bringing to 
bear alternative perspectives and additional information." Sunstein, supra note 81, at 
1549. Sunstein continues: 
A central point here is that individual preferences should not be taken as exoge-
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ry, then, mere aggregation of pre-political preferences leads to sub-opti-
mal social results. 86 
Civic republican theory would lead to the conclusion that majority de-
cisions are optimal only if generated by a deliberative process. And, in-
deed, the literature critical of ballot initiative and referendum procedures 
reflects hostility to unmediated exercises of majority power.87 
Whatever the merits of deliberation-promoting limitations on majority 
power in the state and national political processes,· promoting delibera-
tion is a more problematic basis for limiting majority power in an organi-
zation-like a condominium or homeowners' association-whose foun-
dation and . maintenance reflect market · forces. Consider first the 
argument that markets make deliberation-promoting rules unnecessary. 
Unlike citizens, whose options to exit the polity are limited, potential 
homebuyers are free not to purchase a home in an association-governed 
building or subdivision if the association's rules are unattractive. As a 
result, if rules designed to promote deliberation88 threaten the financial 
or other interests of potential home purchasers, the market price of 
homes in common interest communities should drop. Developers will re-
spond by shifting their efforts to homes without common facilities or to 
nous to politics .... [P]rivate preferences may be a product of adaptation by the 
disadvantaged and interest-induced beliefs on the part of the relatively well-off. 
Republicans are thus unlikely to take existing preferences and entitlements as 
fixed. Both are permissible objects of political deliberation. 
, Id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1528 (1988) 
(noting that republican politics "contemplates ... a self whose identity and freedom 
consist, in part, in its capacity for reflexively critical reconsideration of the ends and 
commitments that it already has and that make it who it is"). 
86 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1550-51 ("[M]odern republicans invoke civic vir-
tue primarily in order to promote deliberation in the service of social justice, not to 
elevate the character of the citizenry."). 
87 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equali-
ty, 54 WASH. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1978) (criticizing efforts at direct democracy as remov-
ing the mediating layer that protects reason and reform); Julian Eule, Judicial Review 
of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1526-27 (1990) (noting that the constitution-
al structure creates the conditions for deliberation); Lawrence Sager, Insular Majori-
ties Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 
HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1412 (1978) ("[W]hile lauding elected bodies as capable of re-
flecting public will, we have clearly charged them with the responsibility of mediating 
majority sentiment with judgments of reasonability and fairness."). But see Lynn A. 
Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 707, 736-44 (1991) (exposing flaws in the argument that representative 
government necessarily provides a greater degree of deliberation than direct referen-
da); Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Gov-
ernment Law, 86 M1cH. L. REv. 930, 953-67 (1988) (same). 
88 A rule requiring that community association rules be reasonable, on pain of ju-
dicial invalidation, is an example. 
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rental housing.89 In that event, the "deliberation promoting" rule would 
not promote deliberation, because there would be no forum in which to 
deliberate. On the other hand, if potential home purchasers view deliber-
ation-promoting rules as attractive, market forces alone should generate 
such rules; no legal requirements would be necessary to generate them. 
Thus, the argument runs, requiring association rules to be deliberation-
promoting would be either counterproductive or superfluous. 
Those who argue that law should provide a set of default rules for cor-
porate governance rather than mandatory rules frequently advance this 
argument.90 The argument counsels rejection of all mandatory rules for 
community associations. It is not dispositive, however. Market discipline 
is rarely perfect. Home purchasers may do little investigation into the 
precise powers the Declaration confers on community associations.91 
Moreover, the Declaration itself may not be precise about the scope of 
authority it confers. These difficµlties leave some room for mandatory 
rules designed to advance the interests of community residents. Howev-
er, they do not indicate that mandatory rules should be constructed to 
promote deliberation among association members or their representa-
tives. 
Deliberative decision making is not an unqualified "good." Delibera-
tion requires time and energy that could be devoted to other pursuits, 
including deliberation about other matters. 92 Perhaps it would be wrong 
to treat deliberation, in Frank Michelman's words, as "strictly a 'cost' and 
not a 'benefit' on the ledger books of life,"93 but it would be equally 
89 Cf Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1524-26 (noting that potential purchasers of units 
in residential associations capitalize the effect of potentially redistributive rules by 
reducing the amount they are willing to pay for units that may be subject to redistri-
bution). One might respond, however, that a world with fewer community associa-
tions might be better than a world with associations whose rules are unattractive. See, 
e.g., Alexander, supra note 60, at 38 ("Legal interference with some group rules, par-
ticularly those controlling membership, undoubtedly does threaten the existence of 
the affected groups. But group existence is not an unqualified good."). 
90 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & F1scHEL, supra note 9, at 17 (noting that, because the 
terms in c<;>rporate governance are fully priced, "the firms that pick the wrong terms 
will fail in competition with other firms competing for capital"). 
91 See Winokur, supra note 2, at 59 & n.246 (citing a federal government survey 
suggesting that 85% of homeowners are not aware of applicable servitude restrictions 
at the time they purchase their homes); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Co-
ercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 883, 894-95 (1988) (noting 
that a purchaser may focus inadequately on servitude terms). 
92 As Bruce Ackerman said in discussing the appropriate role of citizenship in con-
temporary America, "the normal. duties of citizenship had better not be so onerous as 
to make it impossible for Americans to put in a full day's work." See 1 BRUCE ACK-
ERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 312 (1991). 
93 Michelman, supra note 81, at 27. Michelman was referring to political activity, 
but his argument would suggest a similar attitude toward deliberation generally. 
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wrong to ignore the costs of deliberation. Individuals do not deliberate 
without limit over where to eat lunch, what furniture to buy, or how much 
to pay for a car, and the state does not generally intervene to second-
guess individual decisions about how much deliberation is appropriate.94 
That is, when people make decisions about their own self-interest, our 
legal system is generally content to permit them to deliberate as much-· 
or as little-as they like. 
Why would republican theorists seek to impose a greater duty to delib-
erate in public decisions? To the extent that deliberation helps individu-
als transform their perceptions of their own self-interest, it is as valuable 
in private transactions as in public decisions. 95 For Michelman and Sun-
stein, however, the primary attraction of deliberation is its capacity to 
transform attitudes towards the interests of others. Michelman suggests 
that mutual deliberation will cause individuals to recognize their common 
ground with others. 96 This recognition, in turn, will lead to empathy for 
those in different circumstances. Sunstein explicitly recognizes republi-
canism's redistributive cast. 97 
Because residents of any particular common interest community are 
typically less diverse economically than citizens of the state or municipali-
ty in which the community is located, community association governance 
rules are unlikely engines for significant wealth redistribution. Neverthe-
less, community association decisions do have some redistributive poten-
tial. 98 To the extent that republican theory relies on the notion that delib-
eration and dialogue require the beneficiary of a proposed redistribution 
to confront its consequences to others while making the redistribution 
more acceptable to the victim, the theory supports deliberation-promot-
ing rules for' community association decisions.99 Moreover, because com-
94 The qualification "generally" is necessary because, to some extent, statutes and 
judicially created doctrines do relieve individuals from the consequences of decisions 
to which they clearly gave too little thought. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1996) (estab-
lishing a cooling-off period during which consumers may rescind door-to-door sales 
agreements). 
95 Indeed, Sunstein recognizes that " [ s ]ome modern forms of republicanism furnish 
no sharp split between public and private interests, and attempt to channel self-inter-
est in such a way as to promote the common good." Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1565. 
96 See Michelman, supra note 81, at 32. 
97 See Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1551: 
[R]epublicans are hardly hostile to redistribution or to collective efforts to reas-
sess the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements. Indeed, because of the 
republican emphasis on the social conditions for republican deliberation, republi-
can commitments point powerfully in the direction of equalizing political influ-
ence .... 
98 See infra Part V. 
99 Cf. Alexander, supra note 60, at 56-59 (arguing for use of standards rather than 
rules in evaluating community association actions, because standards promote, while 
rules inhibit, dialogue and conversation). 
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munity association residents typically share many common interests, de-
liberation may be more effective in resolving disputes and achieving 
consensus. It is against these potential advantages that the costs of delib-
eration must be weighed. 
3. Reducing Agency Costs 
Majority rule, like any other collective decision making process short of 
unanimous agreement, binds some people to the decisions of others.. This 
raises two significant issues. First, how, and how well, do majorities de-
termine individual preferences? Second, how well do majorities aggre-
gate those preferences? These sorts of problems are often categorized as 
agency costs.100 
Majority determination of preferences is a problem because we gener-
ally assume that each person is the best judge of his own interests. In a 
market, each participant can only bind herself-the person whose prefer-
ences she knows best. By contrast, in a collective regime marked by ma-
jority rule, all participants are bound by. decisions that some of them be-
lieve are not in their interests. Even if we assume that all participants in a 
collective enterprise try to act in the interests of the body as a whole, they 
will be judging the interests of people they understand less well than 
themselves. And, of course, the assumption that participants do, or 
should, try to act in the common interest rather than in their individual 
interests is a hotly contested one.101 
Even if we assume that participants in a collective process could accu-
rately assess the interests of other participants, the problem of aggregat-
ing those interests remains. If we assume that individuals best know their 
own interests, aggregating interests reduces to aggregating preferences. 
In a system of majority rule, then, how do the minority's preferences get 
counted in the aggregation process? One answer is that the voting pro-
cess itself gives minority preferences adequate attention, and that in a 
democracy, as Bruce Ackerman has observed, minorities are supP,osed to 
100 See generally Cass Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1144 & n.59 (1986) (citing the "disjunction between rulers and 
ruled"). 
101 Much of public choice theory rests on the assumption that individuals' motiva-
tions in the political sphere are not substantially different from their motivations in 
market transactions. See, e.g., BucHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 76, at 19-20. Civic 
republicans, by contrast, model a political system in which dialogue leads individuals 
to consider the public, as opposed to private, good. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 
81, at 40; Sunstein, supra note 72, at 57. Marci Hamilton has proposed a public law 
model in which representatives maintain continuous communication with constitu-
ents, but ultimately exercise independent judgment on public law issues. See Marci 
Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with 
an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 477, 523-44 (1994). 
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lose.102 
Unless majority rule is itself the ultimate end, that answer is inade-
quate. The question instead must be whether majority rule is suited to 
achieve the ends for which the collective enterprise is designed. To the 
extent, for instance, that one views redistribution of resources as an ap-
propriate collective goal,103 one might conclude that majorities are likely 
to give inadequate weight to the preferences of those without resources 
to contribute in the pluralist process.104 
Whatever its merit in the public law context, the notion that redistribu-
tion of resources constitutes an appropriate collective goal is less plausi-
ble within privately created associations. If potential members knew that 
an 'association was likely to redistribute resources, potential targets of re~ 
distribution would be highly unlikely to join.105 Hence, in the context of 
private associations, criticisms of majority rule as insufficiently redistribu-
tive are largely irrelevant. 
A more plausible model for a privately created collective enterprise is 
the Buchanan and Tullock model of the state as an enterprise created by 
individuals hoping to increase their utility by eliminating external costs 
and securing external benefits.106 According to this model, a system in 
which majorities always rule would be ill-suited to serve the ends of the 
enterprise's members. Because majority rule does not account for inten-
sity of preferences,107 many individuals would be unwilling to join a col-
lective enterprise in which a mere majority of members could trample on 
important individual interests.108 
As the number of issues and interest groups confronting the collective 
10.2 See Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 719 
(1985) ("[M]inorities are supposed to lose in a democratic system-even when they 
waht very much to win and even when they think (as they often will) that the majority 
is deeply wrong .... "). 
103 See, e.g., RAwLS, supra note 65, at 75-80 (suggesting a scheme designed to im-
prove the expectations of the least advantaged members of society); Sunstein, supra 
note 81, at 1549 ( expressing the republican view that "distribution of wealth is a mat-
ter for political disposition"). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 4 ("The implicit 
normative limit on the use of political power is that it should preserve the relative 
entitlements among the members of the group."). 
104 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 56, at 674-79 (expressing concern that voting 
equality does not compensate for absence of property). From another perspective, 
for those who start with an organic conception of the state, the entire enterprise of 
aggregating individual preferences appears to be fruitless. 
105 Cf. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1524-25 (noting that bargainers with ex ante 
knowledge of potential redistribution would discount the price of membership ac-
cordingly, thereby reducing the amount of actual redistribution). 
106 See BucHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 76, at 43-44. 
107 See id. at 126-28, 131-44. 
108 See id. at 82 ("The individual will anticipate greater possible damage from col-
lective action the more closely this action amounts to the creation and confiscation of 
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grows, the risk to minority interests shrinks. Each group seeking to gar-
ner support for action promoting its own strongly held preferences on an 
issue will trade votes with members of other groups, increasing the 
chance for each group to implement its strongly held preferences.109 In-
deed, vote trading increases the likelihood that minorities with strongly 
held preferences will wield too much power as they overwhelm the inter-
ests of larger but more diffuse groups who face greater difficulty organiz-
ing into a successful pressure group.110 Nevertheless, much constitutional 
scholarship rests on the premise that interest-group politics will inade-
quately protect the interests of "discrete and insular" minorities.111 
Hence, to the extent that the range of decisions facing community as-
sociations is relatively small, majority rule may risk undervaluing the in-
terests of minority members. This problem is not, as we shall see, unique 
to community association law. 
III. CONTRACT AS A CONSTRAINT ON PROTECTION OF 
MINORITY INTERESTS 
A. The Contract Argument 
The public law debate over protection of minority interests has, in es-
sence, been a debate about the terms of the social contract. Since the 
social contract represents a theoretical construct rather than a historical · 
event, 112 scholars in a variety of disciplines and with a variety of perspec~ 
tives have devoted much energy to identifying its appropriate terms. In 
their classic work on public choice, Buchanan and Tullock developed 
models of collective decision making "[b]y approaching the problem of 
the calculus of the single individual as he confronts constitutional choices, 
not knowing with accuracy his own particular role in the chain of collec-
tive decisions that may be anticipated to be carried out in the future."113 
Similarly, Rawls expounds his principles of justice by constructing a hypo-
thetical bargain among persons so situated that "no one is able to design 
principles to favor his particular condition."114 Because the hypothetical 
human and property rights. He will, therefore, tend to choose somewhat more re-
strictive rules for social choice-making in such areas of potential political activity."). 
109 See RoBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 146 (1956) (con-
cluding that government decisions are not so much the pronouncements of majorities 
as "the steady appeasement of relatively small groups"). 
110 See MANCUR OLSoN, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 127-28 (2d ed. 1971) 
(arguing that the groups most likely to be successful in a pluralist process are small 
interest groups in which each member has a large stake). 
111 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 55; at 135-79 ( developing an approach to constitution-
al interpretation dedicated to protecting under-represented minorities). 
112 Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 15 (noting the bask fiction of 
social contract theory). 
113 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 76, at 92. 
114 RAwLS, supra note 65, at 12. 
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choices are made by hypothetical people with hypothetical characteris-
tics, the shape of the resulting social contract-and particularly the scope 
of minority protections-might vary enormously. 
No comparable problems afflict the constitutions that govern private 
residential communities.115 By purchasing a home in a community gov-
erned by a declaration that contemplates an association with rulemaking 
power, a flesh-and-blood person agrees to abide by the association's 
rules. If purchasers want protection against interference with important 
rights, declarations can be drafted to secure those protections. · If pur-
chasers want to ensure deliberation in the association's processes, decla-
rations can provide appropriate procedures for association action. If pur-
chasers are concerned about agency costs, covenants can be drafted to 
reduce those costs. 
It would be absurd to argue that a prospective home purchaser will find 
it worthwhile to negotiate for declaration provisions that maximize her 
own welfare. If, however, protections against association action are im-
portant, developers should find it worth their while to design attractive 
provisions that will induce homeowners to choose their developments, in 
the same way that homeowners choose units with attractive kitchens and 
bathrooms. 116, Choosing among governance provisions is much less oner-
ous for potential homeowners than designing those provisions. And, of 
course, the potential homeowner concerned about community association 
governance retains the option to buy a home not subject to association 
governance. 
Moreover, few people casually decide to purchase a home. Because 
purchasing a home is the largest single investment most people will make, 
they generally take time to assess the quality of that investment. 117 In 
many jurisdictions, though certainly not all, purchasers are routinely rep-
resented by counsel who provide advice about any dangers associated 
with community association governance. As a result, home purchasers 
have both the incentive and the opportunity to become informed about 
115 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1527 ("The feature of unanimous ratification 
distinguishes [the Declaration of covenants, articles of association, and association 
bylaws] from and gives them greater legal robustness than non-unanimously adopted 
public constitutions, not to mention the hypothetical social contracts of Rousseau or 
Rawls."). 
116 Moreover, the increasing sophistication of community association lawyers 
makes it more feasible to tailor declarations to reflect particular market concerns. 
Thus, community association lawyers have their own professional group, the Commu-
nity Associations Institute, which sponsors the usual range of seminars and publica-
tions for interested practitioners. See, e.g., COMMUNITY Ass'Ns INST., supra note 2. 
117 See Natelson, supra note 15, at 60-61 (noting that the size of a home purchas-
er's investment makes "examination of the documents and employment of legal coun-
sel highly cost-effective"). But cf Winokur, supra note 2, at 59-60 (reporting that 
most home purchasers do not retain counsel to review purchase documents). 
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their decision to purchase in a development governed by a community 
association. 
That, in sum, is the contract argument against extending more protec-
tion to community association minorities than is provided in the gov-
erning documents themselves. 
B. Objections to the Contract Argument 
The contract argument, for all of its credibility, faces at least three chal-
lenges. First, because provisions creating association powers are bundled 
with other items more significant to housing consumers, a consumer's 
purchase should not necessarily be treated as a decision to be bound by 
association governance. Second, the contract argument for providing less 
protection to minorities in private settings assumes a distinction between 
the private and public spheres, a distinction that is in fact illusory. Third, 
the contract argument ignores the "good faith" requirement and other 
doctrines of contract law that routinely operate to constrain power appar-
ently bestowed by one party to a contract on the other. This subpart 
considers these three challenges. 
1. The Bundling Problem 
In arguing that all servitudes should be subject to discretionary judicial 
review, Gregory Alexander has invoked the "bundling" problem.118 Al-
exander notes that a land purchaser might buy subject to a servitude, 
even if the purchaser did not want the servitude. He rejects the notion 
that such a purchaser would obtain a discounted price to compensate for 
the unwanted servitude, arguing that because of the complexity of the 
transaction, the purchaser might not have focused on the servitude provi-
sion.119 If Alexander's argument has force for servitudes made explicit in 
the deed, the argument carries even more force with respect to associa-
tion power to impose new obligations on the purchaser; the purchaser 
might well have failed to focus on those unknown obligations. 
Alexander expressly relies on the premise that purchasers engage in 
irrational behavior.120 Taken broadly, as Alexander recognizes, this 
premise challenges not merely enforcement of bundled agreements, but 
enforcement of all contracts.121 Taken more narrowly to apply only when 
118 See Alexander, supra note 91, at 894. Alexander attributes the term "bun-
dling" to Mark Kelman. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GurnE TO CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES 107-09 (1987) (applying bundling theory to explain courts' treatment 
of coercive covenants running with the land). 
119 See Alexander, supra note 91, at 894. 
120 See id. at 895. 
121 Alexander writes: "The real question is what implications the irrational choice 
phenomena should have for the legal role. My view is that it should affect that legal 
system's willingness to interfere with preferences, the realm of private ordering." Id. 
at 895 n.35. · 
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contracts involve bundling, the premise is peculiar. Every decision to 
enter into a contract involves bundled choices.122 A golf club member 
can hardly complain about a club dress code or a monthly charge for 
uneaten meals on the grounds that he agreed to those burdens only un-
willingly as the price for using the club's golf course. An academic could 
not likely avoid teaching responsibilities by contending that he was forced 
to accept them as the price of joining a faculty. Every commitment re-
quires some sacrifice of personal autonomy, but if we preclude people 
from making commitments, we exact from them an even greater sacrifice 
of autonomy.123 
One might limit the bundling argument to cases in which the unwanted 
obligation was trivial in comparison with the overall transaction, making 
it more plausible that the promisor had not focused on the obligation's 
importance. But that modification hardly saves the argument. The more 
trivial the obligation, the less reason for close judicial scrutiny to protect 
the promisor. Bundling problems, then, furnish little justification for res-
cuing unit owners from a contractually created majority rule regime. 
2. The Asserted Emptiness of the Public-Private Distinction 
The contract argument against minority protections assumes that an 
agreement to purchase a unit subject to association governance is funda-
mentally different from the purchase of a home subject to state and mu-
nicipal governance.124 That supposed distinction, however, has been hot-
ly contested. Gerald Frug, for one, has argued that some cities, like many 
homeowner associations, were initially formed by the unanimous consent 
of 1all residents.125 Frug has suggested, moreover, that the circumstances 
of original formation lose significance with the passage of time, as "chil-
dren take over their parents' homes, and the like."126 
One might also argue that the decision to reside in a particular munici-
pality, like the decision to purchase in a particular common interest com-
122 See Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of "Obsolete 
Covenants", 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 546, 578 (1991) (noting that virtually all goods are 
bundled, and that bundling should be a concern only when combined with monopoly 
power); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 1375, 1407 (1994) (agreeing with Robinson that bundling is not threatening in 
the absence of true duress). 
123 As Richard Epstein noted in response to Alexander's argument: "Any bargain 
in any context requires each party to give up something of value in order to obtain 
something else." Epstein, supra note 5, at 912. 
124 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1521-26 (suggesting that the presence of involun-
tary members in an organization makes the organization "public" and justifies sub-
stantially different legal treatment). 
125 See Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowner Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1589, 1590 n.5 (1982) (citing the Mayflower Compact as an example of a 
voluntary agreement forming a city). 
126 Id. at 1590-91. 
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munity, is a "voluntary" act that signifies consent to be governed in ac-
cordance with the municipality's charter. Indeed, Charles Tiebout 
theorizes that competition among municipalities regulates municipal pro-
vision of public goods, because potential residents shop among munici-
palities to find one that provides the mix of public goods best suited to 
their desires.127 This theory rests in large measure on the premise that 
individuals choose their municipalities, much as they choose their homes, 
cars, and other items of importance to them. That premise, however, sug-
gests that there is little reason to identify contract as a reason to provide 
community association minorities with less protection than would be ac-
corded minorities unhappy with local government or even state decisions. 
The argument that minorities choose to submit to local government 
power just as they choose to submit to community association power, 
however, should not be dispositive. Whenever we confront the argument 
that a party should be morally or legally bound by his choice, we need to 
inspect the conditions that led the party to make that choice. In the ex-
treme case, choices made with a gun to the head are not entitled to much 
legal or moral force. In general, the constraints imposed on a potential 
purchaser deciding whether to buy a home in an area governed by a com-
munity association are far less significant than the constraints facing a 
resident trying to decide whether to move into ( or to leave) a particular 
municipality.128 A lifelong resident of New York City might find the 
costs of leaving to be daunting, even if the resident was fed up with City 
policies. Without leaving the city, however, the same person would be 
free to choose among many apartments and homes, governed by a variety 
of community associations or subject to no associations at all. In this 
sense, the "choice" to join-and not to leave-an association is more 
meaningful than the choice to move to, or remain in, a particular munici-
pality. That is, although the difference is largely a matter of degree, con-
tract does provide somewhat greater justification for binding minority 
members to the decisions of a community association than for binding 
minority residents to the decisions of a local government. 
3. Constraints on Power Internal to Contract Law 
A unit owner's agreement to abide by the decisions of a community 
association does not immediately obligate the owner to perform a speci-
fied act or pay a particular sum of money. Rather, the agreement binds 
127 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. 
EcoN. 416, 418 (1956). 
128 For an empirical study suggesting that few citizens leave municipalities out of 
dissatisfaction with political processes, see David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The 
Impact of Judicial Boundaries.• An Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. 
PoL. 73, 92-93 (1989). See also Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout 
Model, AM. EcoN. REv., May 1981, at 93, 93 ( questioning the assumptions underlying 
the Tiebout model). 
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the unit owner to determinations the association might make in the fu-
ture. As a result of the agreement, the association has power to impose 
new duties not specified in the agreement itself. This situation resembles 
the classic relational contract, "characterized by uncertainty about factual 
conditions during performance and an extraordinary degree of difficulty 
in describing specifically the desired adaptations to contingencies."129 
The agreement, here embodied in the Declaration, deals with the uncer-
tainty by creating a mechanism for coping with future problems: associa-
tion governance. 
When relational contracts appear to put one party at the mercy of an-
other, contract doctrine constrains the broad discretion conferred on one 
party, either by holding the agreement unenforceable altogether or by 
reading the agreement's terms to limit discretion. The extreme example 
of an agreement unenforceable because it would give one party complete 
discretion over the other is a contract to enslave oneself. 130 By contrast, 
the obligation to deal in good faith, implied in all contracts, construes the 
contract's terms to limit a party's discretion, even when the letter of the 
agreement appears to confer that discretion.131 For instance, when a con-
tract obligates a seller to deliver as many units as the buyer requires, or 
when the contract obligates the purchaser to take the seller's entire out-
put, the good faith requirement protects the promisor from the promis-
ee's otherwise unlimited discretion to determine "requirements" or "out-
put. "132 
· The good faith obligation rests in large measure on the assumption that 
both parties to the agreement intended to derive benefit from the agree-
ment, that neither party intended, by conferring discretion on the other, 
129 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. 
L. REv. 1089, 1127 (1981); see also Gillette, supra note 122, at 1413-17 (exploring the 
relational nature of community associations). 
13° Cf U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude). 
131 The good faith obligation is embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoN-
TRAC'.I'S § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."). The Uniform Commercial 
Code imposes a similar obligation for contracts within its ambit. See U.C.C. § 1-203 
(1996). For an analysis of the good faith requirement concluding that the require-
ment's central role is to constrain the exercise of discretion, see Steven J. Burton, 
Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. 
L. REv. 369,'372-73 (1980). See also John Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance 
in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1656-57 
(1989) (discussing the role of good faith and fiduciary duties in the close corporation 
context). 
132 See Burton, supra note 131, at 380-81 (noting that the buyer or seller in these 
agreements may manipulate its requirements or output by modifying its methods of 
marketing or production); Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes: Likely Issues for 
LLCs, 66 U. Cow. L. REv. 1043, 1059-60 (1995) (arguing for stronger good faith 
constraints within limited liability companies). 
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to make a "gift."133 Hence, if one party's exercise of contractually con-
ferred discretion would be inconsistent with the notion that the other par-
ty expected to benefit from the contract, then the discretion has not been 
exercised in good faith. 
The point is not to define limits on a community association's exercise 
of discretion; that enterprise is the focus of the next Part. Instead, the 
point is that contract law constrains the exercise of discretion even when 
the parties have not included explicit limits on its exercise. Of course, 
one might argue that in the community association context, in which mi-
nority unit owners have a "voice" in the decisions to which they object, 
courts should be less concerned about the association's decisions than 
they are in contract cases in which the two parties are not engaged in an 
ongoing enterprise. This argument, however, ignores much of the rela-
tional contract literature, which establishes that in long-term contracts, 
the parties are almost inevitably locked together in an ongoing enterprise, 
each with a voice in the other's decisions.134 Moreover, even if courts 
should defer to community association decisions, the basic point remains: 
the existence of a contract among unit owners does not end discussion 
about the scope of association power or the desirability of affording pro-
tection to minority members.135 Because contract law generally con-
strains the exercise of discretion by contracting parties, one would also 
expect to see limits on the exercise of community association discretion. 
In examining those limits, an appropriate next step would be to explore 
the other area in which contractually created decision making bodies ex-
ercise discretion in ways that displease minority members: corporate law. 
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON MAJORITY POWER: LESSONS FROM 
CORPORATE LAW 
Like community associations, corporations are voluntary arrangements 
that bind some people to the actions of others. The issues that arise in 
133 See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E.2d 214, 214-15 (N.Y.1917) (im-
plying a promise to use reasonable efforts, because the agreement would not have 
"such business efficacy as both parties must have intended" without such an implied 
promise). For further discussion of the point, see DeMott, supra note 132, at 1060-61 
( arguing that without the duty of good faith, an investment in an LLC that gave its 
control persons too much power would resemble a gift). 
134 See, e.g., Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Rela-
tions Under Neo-Classical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 895-
98 (1978) (discussing the inter-party exchange mechanisms that differentiate relation-
al from discrete, classical contracts). 
135 As Professor Coffee has put it in the context of opt-out rules for corporate 
charters, "contractual freedom logically can mean no more than the freedom to con-
tract to the extent permitted by the law of contracts. Thus, it follows that no exculpa-
tory provision or other provision should be tolerated that abridges the duty of good 
faith." Coffee, supra note 131, at 1665. 
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community association governance are by no means identical to corpo-
rate governance issues. The purposes of the enterprises, the incentive 
structures under which their decisionmakers operate, and the threats to 
minority interests differ significantly. Nevertheless, at a time when com-
munity association law is in its infancy, or at best early adolescence, the 
more developed body of corporate law provides a useful background 
against which to examine problems of community association govern-
ance. 
Corporate governance debates have focused, in large measure, on two 
types of conflicts: those between corporate managers and shareholders, 
and those between majority and minority shareholders.136 Manager/ 
shareholder issues arise even when all shareholders share an identical in-
terest in maximizing the market value of their investment. Because the 
manager might have personal interests that conflict with shareholder 
objectives, corporate governance literature has focused on how to disci-
pline managers to act in the interest of the shareholders. By contrast, 
majority/minority conflicts generally arise· not when shareholders have 
common interests, but when shareholder interests diverge, as they do 
most frequently in closely held corporations. The question in these situa-
tions is how much account the majority must take of minority prefer-
ences. 
Both types of conflict exist in community associations. The following 
subparts consider the treatment each type of conflict has received in the 
corporate context, and examine possible applications of corporate learn-
ing to the community association context. 
A. Manager/Shareholder Conflicts 
Corporate managers ostensibly act on behalf of shareholders. Indeed, 
the law treats them as fiduciaries for the shareholders. At the same time, 
however, managers have their own interests, some of which create a sig-
nificant potential for conflict with the interests of shareholders. Manag-
ers, like other agents, may shirk their responsibilities; that is, they may 
invest less energy in corporate decision making than would be optimal for 
the shareholders. They may also divert corporate assets to personal use. 
Finally, managers may be interested in using their corporate offices to 
maximize their compensation or preserve their position with the corpora-
tion.137 A principal question in the corporate governance literature, 
136 For a useful comparison of the two sets of conflicts, see William W. Bratton, 
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 
GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 1084, 1124-25 (1993) (comparing the two types of conflict). 
137 Melvin Eisenberg has identified these three divergences of interest between 
corporate managers and shareholders, and has labeled them, respectively, shirking, 
traditional conflicts of interest, and positional conflicts. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, 
at 1471-72. 
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therefore, is how best to structure the entity to assure that the interests of 
shareholders and managers converge; that is, to minimize agency costs. 
1. The Contract Paradigm 
In the academic literature, debate has raged about the extent to which 
mandatory rules (as distinguished from default rules that may be modi-
fied by provisions in the corporate charter or bylaws) are necessary to 
protect shareholders from management misbehavior. For a time, some 
commentators argued that mandatory rules were entirely unnecessary, 
because markets would discipline managers adequately. The central ten-
et of the argument was the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis-the 
notion that market prices reflect all public information about firms, in-
cluding information about governance structures.138 Hence, if a firm 
adopted inefficient governance rules, the firm would have difficulty at-
tracting investors, stock prices would drop, the firm would become a 
takeover target, and management would be replaced.139 
This absolutist approach has been rejected as a matter of corporate 
doctrine, and, to a large degree, as a matter of academic theory.140 Virtu-
ally all state corporation statutes include at least some mandatory rules. 
Scholars have identified a number of problems with the free-market ap-
proach, including shareholders' insufficient incentive to inquire into gov-
ernance structures141 and their lack of control over the structure and tim-
ing of the amendment process.142 
The focus on deficiencies in the process of creating a corporate govern-
ance structure, however, has reinforced the notion that shareholders and 
138 See EASTERBROOK & FrscHEL, supra note 9, at 19-21 (arguing that, in an effi-
cient market, prices will reflect information about corporate governance mecha-
nisms). 
139 Put more modestly, the argument ran that even if markets imperfectly assessed 
the efficiency of competing governance structures, market assessments would remain 
relatively better than assessments made by state legislators or other alternative rule 
givers. See id. at 19. · 
140 See Bratton, supra note 136, at 1084-85, 1103 (noting the developing consensus 
that the pure economic model is flawed and that the American Law Institute has since 
adopted mandatory norms). 
141 See Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: 
The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1836-37 
(1989) (noting that the cost of information prevents shareholders from discovering the 
effect on share price of many value-decreasing provisions in the corporate charter); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 
and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BRooK. L. REv. 919, 933-35 (1988) (describing 
the mechanism by which even large public shareholders lose their incentive to be-
come informed and influence corporate voting); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory 
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1575-77 (1989) (same). 
142 See Coffee, supra note 131, at 1674-75 (describing the potential for agenda ma-
nipulation by management). · 
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managers, like most contracting parties, contract with each other with the 
expectation of mutual benefit. Were it not for the deficiencies in the pro-
cess that make it implausible to treat corporate charter provisions as an 
accurate reflection of the parties' expectations, there would be little rea-
son to impose mandatory rules. Because of these deficiencies, the argu-
ment runs, mandatory rules are necessary to implement shareholder ex-
pectations.143 In particular, corporate shareholders and managers may 
not agree to dispense with the managers' duty of loyalty-or, as the ALI 
has recently restyled it, the duty of fair dealing.144 
Nevertheless, in defining shareholder rights and managerial duties, 
courts have considered the likelihood that informed parties would bar-
gain for judicial 'relief from managerial misbehavior. The following sec-
tions examine two such areas in which courts have done so: the business 
.. judgment rule and the limitations on managerial self-dealing. 
2. The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule 
Both the ALi's Principles of Corporate Governance and the courts of 
most states apply the business judgment rule when shareholders chal-
lenge the wisdom of a managerial decisions. The rule insulates from legal 
challenge the actions of corporate directors "taken in good faith and in 
the legitimate exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate 
furtherance of corporate purposes"145 even if "the results show that what 
they did was unwise or inexpedient."146 · 
143 The goals and content of those rules remain a matter of considerable dispute. 
Some scholars have suggested that the rules should reflect the hypothetical bargain 
the parties would have reached had it not been for impediments to contracting. See, 
e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Courts and Corporations: A Comment on Coffee, 89 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1692, 1694-95 (1989) (arguing that the hypothetical bargain and traditional 
fiduciary duty approaches to interpretation of the corporate charter produce essen-
tially the same results). On the conceptual difficulties associated with the hypotheti-
cal bargains approach, see generally Charny, supra note 6, at 1816-17 (noting that in 
practice the hypothetical bargain analysis quickly becomes complex and subjective). 
Coffee, by contrast, argues that, rather than seeking to construct hypothetical bar-
gains, courts should construct mandatory rules that induce parties to bargain con-
cretely for terms they want. See Coffee, supra note 131, at 1625-28. 
144 See AMERICAN L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.01 (1994) (articulating the duty of fair dealing). Com-
ment d to § 5.09 permits shareholders or disinterested directors to approve specific 
types of self-dealing transactions, but provides that the Principles do not "permit[ ] 
the corporation's directors or shareholders to dispense generally with or generally 
modify the substantive and procedural rules ... that govern conduct of directors and 
senior executives and the judicial review of such conduct (as contrasted with the ap-
proval of a specific transaction or type of transaction)." Id. § 5.09 cmt. d. 
145 Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629 (N.Y. 1979). 
146 Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 124 (1912). As Easterbrook and Fis-
chel have noted, "[s]tatements of the [business judgment] rule vary; its terms are far 
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Is there reason to believe that informed shareholders would bargain for 
the business judgment rule, which denies them the right to recover for 
losses caused by management's bad judgment? There is if one assumes 
that the market is better than the courts at disciplining managers who 
"shirk" their duties by acting carelessly.147 How does the market disci-
pline managers and directors? Because capital markets are generally effi-
cient, a corporation's bad management will soon result in higher borrow-
ing costs and a reduced stock price. These changes send signals to three 
important groups: shareholders, who may choose to replace ineffective 
managers and directors; individuals and firms looking for takeover 
targets, who may see an undervalued firm plagued by poor management 
as an inviting opportunity; and other potential employers, who will take 
past performance into account in deciding which managers to hire.148 
Hence, a manager or director whose decisions cause costs to rise or stock 
prices to decline may personally bear many of the consequences of those 
bad decisions. The business judgment rule, then, rests in some measure 
on the conviction that courts, with little stake in their own decisions, will 
be less able to discern and advance the interests of shareholders than 
corporate managers and directors, who have strong incentives to make 
sound and careful business judgments. 
The risk aversion of corporate managers, who are less able than ordina-
ry shareholders to diversify their risk profile, provides another justifica-
tion for the business judgment rule.149 Shareholders can diversify their 
portfolios to avoid excessive risk. They want each corporate manager to 
pursue opportunities that offer a high expected return, even if that return 
comes only at substantial risk. Managers, by contrast, might be wary of 
less important than the fact that there is a specially deferential approach." EASTER-
BROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 93 .. 
147 Courts typically justify the business judgment rule by noting that judges, com-
pared to corporate directors, are ill-equipped to make business judgments. See, e.g., 
Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 630-31 (noting that the "individual capabilities and experi-
ence [of corporate directors] peculiarly qualify them" to render business judgments). 
As Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have observed, courts often foray into 
technical areas where they lack expertise. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 
9, at 94 (noting that judges decide such matters as "whether engineers have designed 
the· compressors on a jet engine properly," and "whether the farmer delivered 
pomegranates conforming to the industry's specifications"). When courts decline to 
second-guess business judgments, they do so, according to Easterbrook and Fischel, 
because they could not hope to discipline manager misbehavior better than the mar-
ket does. See id. at 94-100 ( discussing the increased incentives of managers in the 
context of long-term relational contracts to be faithful agents). 
148 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 96-97 (noting the disciplining 
effect on managers of the larger market for corporate control). 
149 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.) (finding that the 
business judgment rule is necessary to remove disincentives that_ would otherwise pre-
vent corporate managers from taking risks). 
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such opportunities, even without the added threat of liability for breach 
of fiduciary duty.· The business judgment rule, by mitigating the risk of 
liability, reduces the incentives for overly cautious corporate decision 
·making. 
A number of courts have purported to apply the business judgment 
rule to community associations, often citing the experience that board 
members have in dealing with association issues.150 The rule's fit, howev-
er, is problematic in the community association context. The personal 
incentives that induce corporate officers and directors to act carefully do 
not apply with equal force to members of a community association board. 
Officers and board members typically are not compensated for their ef-
forts, and they are unlikely. to be concerned about whether some other 
community association, at some time in the future, might want their serv-
ices as an officer or director. Community association board members do 
not put their livelihoods on the line whenever they make a decision of 
significance to the community.151 Moreover, unlike corporate sharehold-
ers, community association residents are not generally in a position to 
q.iversify. For most, their home will be their most significant investment. 
Residents, then, may want managers to act cautiously; risk-taking may be 
undesirable. As a result, even assuming that all community association 
shareholders have identical interests, it is. not at all clear that market 
forces will be adequate to induce board members to perform their duties 
with the optimal level of care. 
3. Self-Dealing 
Melvin Eisenberg has drawn a useful distinction between two kinds of 
self-dealing in the corporate context: traditional conflicts of interest-un-
fair diversion of shareholder assets to manager use; and positional con-
flicts-attempts to maintain and enhance managerial position at share-
holder expense.152 In the corporate context, Eisenberg concludes that 
traditional conflicts are a far less serious problem because most top man-
agers have internalized social norms against diversion ?f shareholder as-
150 See, e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 
1322 (N.Y. 1990) (applying the business judgment rule to the decisions of a co-op 
board, and commenting that "board members will possess experience of the peculiar 
needs of their building and its residents not shared by the court"). See generally 
Natelson, supra note 15, at 52 (noting that, "despite their stated reliance upon [the 
business judgment rule,] the courts that purport to apply it to [private ownership as-
sociations] actually impose reasonableness standards"). 
151 Cf Gillette, supra note 122, at 1428 (noting that, unlike corporate board mem-
bers, association board members stand to gain little financially from their efforts). 
Although outside directors of business corporations do not typically earn their liveli-
hood from board service, they do have a financial stake in retaining their positions. 
152 See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1471-72 (distinguishing between the two forms 
of self-dealing). 
312 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:273 
sets.153 By contrast, he argues, most top managers achieved their posi-
tions "in part through the appetite for position,"154 suggesting that a 
weaker set of moral constraints operates when positional conflicts are in-
volved. 
Corporate law has long prohibited diversion of shareholder assets, and 
in recent decades has engaged in more extensive policing of positional 
conflicts. In the community association context, however, positional con-
flicts are rarely a money issue. There is little opportunity for uncompen-
sated community association officials to enhance their unpaid positions at 
the expense of association members.155 Although community association 
officials may use their positions to satisfy their own instinctive or subcon-
scious drive for power and authority, residents harmed by arbitrary use of 
power will generally know they are being harmed. This makes the voting 
mechanism an effective one for disciplining officials who abuse power. 
As with corporate officials, socialization serves as a strong protection 
against diversion of shareholder assets. Nevertheless, developer diver-
sion of shareholder assets did provoke enactment of the federal Condo-
minium and Cooperative Conversion Protection and Abuse Relief Act.156 
The Act permits associations to nullify sweetheart deals between devel-
opers and related entities made before the developer loses control of the 
association.157 The Act thus polices a form of abuse comparable to the 
self-dealing prohibited by corporate law. 
B. Majority/Minority Conflicts 
Much of the literature on corporate governance focuses on the extent 
to which markets discipline the behavior of corporate managers.158 Mar-
153 See id. at 1472-73. 
154 See id. at 1473. 
155 See Gillette, supra note 122, at 1428 ("Service as a member of an association 
board of directors does not return the kind of benefits that might lead those who 
occupy management positions in other contexts to maximize objectives other" than 
their constituents' welfare."). 
156 15 u.s.c. §§ 3601-3616 (1994). 
157 See West 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 West 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 
188, 201 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the statute grants co-op shareholders the right to 
terminate a lease between the co-op board as lessor and the sponsor as lessee when 
the leased premises were designed to serve the cooperative unit owners). Before the 
West 14th Street case, the statute generally was understood to bar self-dealing con-
tracts when "the sponsor retained, as a condition of purchase, the right to provide 
recreation and other essential services to the shareholders for high fees." Jonathan 
Honig, Leases Between New York Co-ops and Sponsors, N.Y. REAL EsT. L. REP., 
May 1996, at 8. 
158 Compare EASTERBROOK & F1scHEL, supra note 9, at 93-97 (arguing that mar-
ket prices make it relatively easy for investors and employers to evaluate managerial 
performance, and consequently managers have a strong incentive to perform well), 
with Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Con-
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kets are less likely to discipline corporate shareholders, who are likely to 
be less concerned about keeping salaried positions with the company or 
impressing potential employers. In this sense, as in others, the difficulties 
facing unit owners in a common interest community more closely resem-
ble majority/minority conflicts in corporate law. How then, does corpo-
rate law treat these conflicts? 
Corporate law reflects a tension between two often repeated premises. 
First, each shareholder is entitled to act out of "selfish ownership." Sec-
ond, some shareholders-particularly those who enjoy control of the cor-
poration-owe a fiduciary duty to the others.159 
1. Publicly Held Corporations 
Conflicts among shareholders would not be serious in publicly held 
corporations if we were to assume that all shareholders seek the same 
benefit out of stock ownership: an increase in value of their investment. 
Shareholders as such generally have no managerial responsibilities, so du-
ty of care issues rarely arise.160 Moreover, so long as all shareholders are 
identically situated, any shareholder action that affects one share affects 
all shares. By acting in self-interest, each shareholder acts in the common 
interest. Of course, even identically situated shareholders might disagree 
about important corporate issues, but informed shareholders should per-
ceive that a combination of voting rights and market forces make majori-
ty .rule an acceptable, if not optimal, mechanism for resolving those dis-
agreements. As we have seen, majority rule generally produces optimal 
tract, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1421 (1985) (noting that the market for hiring top 
managers is virtually non-existent and that hiring is all done by directors who are 
responsible to current management for their positions). 
159 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657,663 (Mass. 1976) 
(noting the tension between the majority shareholder's fiduciary duty to the minority 
and its right to "selfish ownership"); see also J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope 
of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 9, 
12 (1987) (arguing that imposing a fiduciary duty upon controlling shareholders is 
necessary to protect minority shareholders). 
160 But cf. Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). 
In Smith, the corporation's articles of organization and bylaws included a provision 
that required approval of shareholders holding 80% of shares before the board could 
take any binding action. Because the corporation had only four equal shareholders, 
the provision effectively gave each shareholder veto power over any corporate action. 
One shareholder refused to approve the declaration of dividends, which resulted in 
significant tax penalties. See id. at 800. The court held that the dissenting shareholder 
had violated "any reasonable interpretation of a duty of utmost good faith and loyal-
ty." Id. at 803 (internal quotations omitted). This conclusion appears to have been 
based in part on the dissenting shareholder's desire to avoid personal income taxation 
on any dividends declared. Had it not been for this divergence between personal 
interests and those of the other shareholders, however, the court might well have 
treated the same behavior as a breach of the duty of care. 
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outcomes when the interests of each voter are identical.161 Moreover, if a 
particular shareholder disagrees with the majotity's choices, the share-
holder has a ready market for his shares. 
Shareholders are not identically situated, however. Even in a publicly 
held corporation, some shareholders will have interests other than maxi-
mizing share value. A majority shareholder, for instance, might have a 
substantial interest in a potential contract partner of the corporation. A 
contract unfavorable to the corporation could still be in the interest of the 
majority shareholder, who could use the contract as a device to siphon 
corporate assets away from the corporation and its minority shareholders. 
Such an arrangement involves classic self-dealing. Investors would not 
buy shares in a corporation with the expectation that the majority share-
holder would engage in such behavior, and courts typically scrutinize 
these self-dealing contracts with great care.162 
Similarly, if controlling shareholders concoct an arrangement to appro-
priate value from other shareholders to themselves, courts will not sustain 
the arrangement if it advances no business purpose of the corporation. 
Zahn v. Transamerica Corp. 163 is the leading case on this issue. Axton-
Fisher had issued two classes of common stock. Class A stockholders 
held a privilege to convert their shares to Class B stock on a one-for-one 
basis. The corporation had the right to call shares of Class A stock at $60 
per share, plus dividends accrued. Class B stockholders held most of the 
voting power in Axton-Fisher.164 Transamerica acquired about 80% of 
Axton-Fisher's Class B stock and two-thirds of the Class A stock. Ac-
cording to the complaint, when Transamerica learned that the value of 
Axton-Fisher's principal asset-leaf tobacco-had tripled, Transamerica 
called all of the Class A stock at $60 per share. Transamerica then sold 
the tobacco, liquidated Axton-Fisher, and pocketed the proceeds. Oh 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65. 
162 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). Sinclair, the 
majority shareholder of its subsidiary, caused the subsidiary to contract with a related 
entity and then arranged for the related entity to breach the contract, to .the subsidia-
ry's detriment. See id. at 722-23. In holding Sinclair liable to the subsidiary's minority 
shareholders, the court noted the self-dealing aspect of the transaction and concluded 
that it "does not satisfy the standard of intrinsic fairness." Id. at 723. Of course, 
courts could treat cases like Sinclair Oil as breaches of duty by the subsidiary's of-
ficers and directors, all nominees of the parent. But those officers and directors act in 
the interests of the owner of the majority of shares. Only the divergence of interest 
between majority and minority, and the conclusion that the majority is not arbitrarily 
entitled to impose its will on the minority, would result in any fault on the part of the 
officers and directors. 
163 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947) (stating that directors did not act in the share-
holders' interest in redeeming their stock rather than allowing them to participate in 
the liquidation of the company). 
164 According to the court, 71.5% of outstanding Class B stock constituted 46.7% 
of the voting stock in the corporation. See id. at 39. 
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these facts, the Third Circuit held that Axton-Fisher's board, dominated 
as it was by Transamerica's nominees, was not entitled to act on behalf of 
the dominant Class B stockholders at the expense of the Class A stock-
holders. The court emphasized that "under the allegations of the com-
plaint there was no reason for the redemption of the Class A stock to be 
followed by the liquidation of Axton-Fisher except to enable the Class B 
stock to profit at the expense of the Class A stock."165 A majority owner, 
therefore, may not engage in pure redistribution from one class of share-
holders to another without some independent business purpose.166 
At the same time, majority shareholders are entitled to pursue a busi-
ness policy that is in their own self-interest, so long as their actions do not 
involve a disproportionate transfer of assets from the corporation to 
themselves. Thus, if a majority shareholder who is strapped for cash 
seeks declaration of large dividends, the majority breaches no duty, even 
if reinvestment arguably would be better for the corporation. 167 Here, 
the majority shareholder takes only its proportionate share of dividends 
and also bears a proportionate share of any decline in stock price if the 
market concludes that the corporation's dividend policy is unwise. There 
is no reason to believe that shareholders would want to contract to bar 
the majority from setting such a dividend policy, since the market would 
protect against abuse of power by the majority. 
Control of the corporation gives majority shareholders (and even 
shareholders who own a minority, but controlling, bloc of stock) a premi-
um on their investment, an opportunity to derive benefits not available to 
all shareholders. This opportunity has led some to argue that controlling 
shareholders should share this premium with other shareholders.168 De-
fenders of existing doctrine, which generally permits controlling share-
holders to keep the control premium, argue that an obligation to share 
165 Id. 
166 Easterbrook and Fischel characterize corporate rules that prevent pqre redistri-
bution as rules against theft-rules that any shareholder would support: 
A rule against confiscation would be created by contract even if it were not part 
of the law. Whoever controlled a corporation would find it advantageous to in-
sert an anticonfiscation provision in the articles of incorporation. If he did not, 
the firm could not expect to receive much for its shares. New shareholders would 
fear confiscation and take (expensive) steps to protect their interest. 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 125. 
167 See Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 721-22 (holding that a parent corporation did not 
act improperly when it caused its subsidiary to declare large dividends at a time when 
the parent was in need of cash). 
168 See William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the 
Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505,515 (1965). Andrews argued that sharing of the 
control premium would not deter efficient transfers. He reasoned that if a transfer is 
efficient, the control buyer should be willing to purchase all of the corporate shares, 
not simply a controlling block, because each share would be more valuable after re-
placement of the existing inefficient management. See id. at 517-18. 
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would deter efficient transfers of control. 169 They argue that sharehold-
ers generally would want sellers to keep those premiums as a mechanism 
for keeping the corporation efficient and stock prices high.170 The explic-
it assumption is that shareholders generally are risk neutral investors who 
can diversify their investments.171 Hence, so long as a particular rule 
maximizes corporate value, shareholders would prefer that rule ex ante, 
even if it might result in an unequal division of corporate gains. 
2. Closely Held Corporations 
Because shareholders in close corporations typically do not have diver-
sified portfolios,172 they tend to be risk averse rather than risk neutral. 
Not only do these shareholders tend to have a large proportion of their 
tangible assets invested in the enterprise, 173 but in many cases their 
human capital-their means of earning a living-is also tied up with the 
enterprise.174 Moreover, their investment is not liquid. Even if close cor-
poration shareholders wanted to divest themselves of a significant portion 
of their investment, the market for minority interests in close corpora-
tions is not a vigorous one. 
Even if it were easy to measure the value of shares in a closely held 
corporation, it is not at all clear that the founders of such a business 
would want the controlling shareholders to maximize share value above 
169 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 127 ("Sharing the control pre-
mium would stifle transfers rather than enrich minority investors."); cf Einer 
Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 
1465, 1493-1523 (1992) (attempting to reconcile existing case law with a formulation 
that would sometimes, but not always, permit controlling shareholders to retain con-
trol premiums). 
170 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 119-26 (arguing that minority 
shareholders benefit from control transactions, even if they obtain less than their pro-
rata portion of the overall gain); Elhauge, supra note 169, at 1522 n.201 ("In establish-
ing a default rule, the best corporate law can do is to assume the parties would have 
consented to the rule that produces the greatest wealth for the participants."). 
171 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 120 (arguing that large financial 
institutions generally have these characteristics). 
172 See Hetherington, supra note 159, at 23-24 ( contrasting the ownership of public 
and closely held corporations). 
173 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1675, 1690 (1991) ("Close corporation shareholders tend to have 
invested substantial personal wealth in the enterprise, magnifying the consequences of 
any business decision as to a particular shareholder." (footnote omitted)). 
174 See F. Hodge O'Neal, Introduction to Symposium, 22 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 1, 
6 (1987) (emphasizing the expectation of future employment). Our legal system fre-
quently balks at arrangements by which individuals lose the benefit of their human 
capital. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 
VA. L. REv. 383,385 (1993) (examining such restraints in areas of employment, debt-
or-creditor, and family law). 
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all else. Often, the expectations of shareholders revolve around employ-
ment opportunities, dividend policies, and other aspects of the business 
not easily reducible to the simple "maximize share value" formula. For 
instance, if a close corporation had a policy of declaring no dividends, and 
combined that policy with a refusal to hire minority shareholders, a mi-
nority shareholder might be unable to derive any effective benefit from 
his unmarketable shares. Few close corporation shareholders would will-
ingly put themselves at such risk, even if the corporation's policy was to 
maximize the value of the business ( and therefore of corporate shares in 
the aggregate). 
As a result of this reality, some courts have limited the right of majority 
shareholders to freeze out minority shareholders. Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc.175 has become a leading case on the protection of 
minority interests in close corporations. After some deterioration in rela-
tions between Wilkes and the three other shareholders, Wilkes· an-
nounced his intention to exercise his appraisal rights. The corporation 
then held a directors' meeting, at which the board expelled Wilkes from 
the corporate position he had long held and denied him a salary.176 At 
the next annual meeting, Wilkes was not re-elected as a corporate direc-
tor or officer. He then sued for breach of fiduciary duty. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court held that Wilkes's complaint stated a claim, 
indicating that majority shareholders in a closely held corporation may 
not squeeze out a minority shareholder without first demonstrating a le-
gitimate business purpose for their action.177 The court emphasized that 
"[t]here was no showing of misconduct on Wilkes's part as a director, 
officer or employee of the corporation which would lead us to approve 
the majority action as a legitimate response to the disruptive nature of an 
undesirable individual bent on injuring or destroying the corporation."178 
The court went on to state that even if a corporation did have a business 
purpose for acting adversely to the interests of a minority shareholder, 
the shareholder might still be able to prevail by showing that the purpose 
"could have been achieved through an alternative course of action less 
harmful to the minority's interest."179 
Shareholders in close corporations rarely draft agreements that resolve 
in advance all pot~ntial conflicts among them. Because the corporation is 
designed to be an enduring enterprise rather than a one-shot endeavor, 
shareholders would find it impossible to anticipate all the circumstances 
that might enable one group of shareholders to harm another. 180 As a 
175 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
176 See id. at 661. 
177 See id. at 663. 
178 Id. at 664. 
179 Id. at 663. 
180 See Charny, supra note 6, at 1871 (commenting that opportunities for gain may 
be difficult to anticipate in advance); Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1465 (noting that 
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result, courts must construe the parties' agreement as disputes arise.181 
But the same wide variety of contingencies that makes it difficult for par-
ties to specify rights and obligations by contract also makes it difficult for 
courts to issue definitive pronouncements with sufficient generality to 
have significant precedential effect. In Wilkes, for instance, the court 
held that the majority had acted improperly by excluding Wilkes from 
employment. In other circumstances, however, excluding a shareholder 
from employment may be entirely appropriate.182 
Nevertheless, Wilkes is significant because the court tried to set out a 
general delineation of the duty owed to minority shareholders in close 
corporations. The duty differs from the wealth-maximization norm that 
typically guides analysis of management decisions in publicly held corpo-
rations.183 According to the Wilkes court, a decision that serves a demon-
strable business purpose nevertheless violates the rights of minority 
shareholders if the corporation could have accomplished the same pur-
pose with less harm to the minority.184 At the same time, the court's 
formulation does not require majority shareholders to maximize the re-
turn to minority shareholders; Wilkes implicitly rejects any corporate ver-
sion of Rawls's egalitarian difference principle.185 To the extent that the 
Wilkes principle reflects the understanding of close corporation share-
long-term contracts are unlikely to account for all future contingencies, "because the 
tree of events will branch beyond the ideas of the future that will be conceived when 
the contract is made"). 
181 How courts should approach this task has been a matter of considerable con-
troversy. The dominant school suggests that courts should seek to give effect to the 
parties' probable expectations, derived not only from contract documents, but from 
other circumstances. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1466 (discussing cases of "judi-
cial intervention when enforcement of bargained-out structural and distributional 
rules would defeat a shareholder's fair expectations"); Hetherington, supra note 159, 
at 23 (arguing that this position is faithful to the intent of the parties, because "[i]t is 
unlikely that the parties would have agreed, had they addressed explicitly the issue 
from the outset, that in the event of disagreement the majority should have the right 
to exclude the minority from the profits of the business"). David Charny, by contrast, 
has suggested interpretive rules that minimize bargaining costs by inducing parties to 
expend the least effort in bargaining around the court's interpretation-even if that 
interpretation does not reflect the choice most parties would want. See Charny, supra 
note 6, at 1877-78. Charny also notes that questions about the generality of assump-
tions about the parties attend all hypothetical bargains. See id. at 1820. 
182 See Mitchell, supra note 173, at 1706-07 ("Obviously, the decision to employ an 
individual is a business decision generally entrusted to a corporation's board of direc-
tors. Equally obviously, it cannot always be a breach of fiduciary duty, even in a close 
corporation, to refuse or cease to employ a particular shareholder in the business."). 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 162-71. 
184 See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
185 See RAWLS, supra note 65, at 75 (stating that social order should not "establish 
and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the 
advantage of those less fortunate"). 
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holders, that understanding appears to .be that majority shareholders may 
pursue wealth maximization at the expense of shareholder equality, but 
only if they can demonstrate that the two goals are mutually exclusive. 
In a number of ways, the position of a member of a community associa-
tion is akin to that of a minority shareholder in a closely held corpora-
tion.186 First, the agreements creating and regulating the association, like 
those governing the close corporation, are relational in nature and 
designed to endure for a long period of time. As a result, it is unrealistic 
to expect the parties to anticipate all of the conflicts that might arise dur-
ing the agreement's life. Not all disputes, therefore, will be resolvable by 
referring to the agreement's explicit language. Second, a unit owner in a 
common interest community, like a close corporation minority sharehold-
er, faces difficulty in diversifying his investment; even the down payment 
required to qualify for a mortgage is likely to represent the largest single 
investment most homeowners will make. Third, market value inade-
quately reflects the benefit a unit owner expects from his investment, just 
as market value inadequately reflects the benefits expected by a close 
corporation shareholder. Homeowners typically derive benefits beyond 
market value from their homes, such as memories, attachments to neigh-
bors and neighborhoods, and the costs and inconveniences of moving. 
Each of these similarities might lead unit owners to prefer limited pro-
tection against community association action, even when the governing 
documents confer no explicit protection. Because of the relational nature 
of the agreement among unit owners, the governing documents them-
selves cannot be expected to specify all of the protections an owner might 
want in the future. Because most unit owners will not be able to diversi-
fy, risk aversion would lead them to reject a rule that permitted associa-
tions to maximize the collective welfare without regard to the distribu-
tional effects of association decisions. Finally, because a unit's sale price 
does not represent its full value to its owner, for most unit owners selling 
the unit will not be an adequate response to undesirable association poli-
cies. 
V. MINORITIES IN THE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION CONTEXT: 
ADDRESSING CONCRETE PROBLEMS 
As we have seen, despite its apparent advantages, majority rule risks 
undervaluing minority interests. By outvoting the minority, the majority 
avoids confronting and evaluating minority concerns. This results in two 
sorts of inefficiency. First, the organization itself may take actions that 
generate costs without commensurate benefits. Second, the prospect of 
such actions may discourage others from entering into collective enter-
186 See generally Natelson, supra note 15, at 52 (noting analogies between the close 
corporation and community associations). 
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prises, even when collective action could eliminate inefficient holdout and 
freerider problems. 
In the corporate setting, institutional constraints on the behavior of 
managers and majority shareholders mitigate some of the most serious 
difficulties of majority rule. When institutional constraints are inade-
quate, an express contract among the members may reduce the risk of 
harm to the minority. One of the lessons from close corporation law, 
however, is that the range of opportunities for collective action is so great 
that express contracts cannot contemplate all of the circumstances that 
might lead a majority to act opportunistically. Legal rules may therefore 
be helpful in defining the appropriate scope of majority power. 
This Part expldres the range of situations in which community associa-
tion majorities might inflict harm on minority members. Based in part on 
a background derived from other areas of public and private law, the Part 
examines whether and when legal constraints on association action are 
desirable, and when, by contrast, institutional constraints on majority ac-
tion make judicial intervention superfluous, if not counterproductive. 
A. Community Association Decisions that Redistribute Market Value 
Start with two relatively uncontroversial assumptions. First, unit own-
ers in common interest communities generally expect net benefit, .not net 
harm, from community association activity. Second, because their units 
represent a large portion of their total assets, unit owners tend to be risk 
averse with respect to their units. Given these assumptions, it is not diffi-
cult to see that unit owners generally would oppose giving community 
associations the power to take actions that redistribute market value from 
some units to others.187 The risk of redistribution is a net harm to risk 
averse owners, a harm not counterbalanced by any benefit, since purely 
redistributive actions create no net benefit for the community.188 
Moreover, to the extent that associations deal with too few issues to 
permit effective formation of shifting coalitions, the risk that the majority 
will not account for minority preferences is significant. Members of the 
majority on one issue will be unlikely to worry that they might need mi-
nority support on some other issue. At the time the association is 
187 Indeed, even if we assume that unit owners are risk neutral, they might oppose 
redistributive actions to the extent those actions encourage members of the associa-
tion to engage in unproductive rent-seeking, rather than more productive activity. On 
similar grounds, Easterbrook and Fischel justify prohibitions on redistribution in pub-
licly held corporations, where they assume shareholders are risk neutral. See EASTER-
BROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 124-26 (likening prohibitions on redistribution to 
prohibitions on theft). 
188 Moreover, as Robert Ellickson has pointed out, even if residents are not risk 
averse, the administrative costs of redistributive programs make redistribution a nega-
tive sum game. See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1525 (noting that administrative ex-
penses will result in a dead-weight loss to unit owners). 
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formed, potential members would find it difficult to anticipate, and pro-
hibit, all potential forms of redistribution, so that failure to bar a particu-
lar action in the Declaration or in the association's bylaws would hardly 
establish that association members were willing to confer uncontrolled 
power on the majority.189 The case for judicial invalidation of purely re-
distributive actions, then, is particularly strong .. 
Few association actions are purely redistributive, however. Most redis-
tributive actions serve some community purpose. As we have seen, a 
number of scholars have championed deliberation-promoting rules as a 
means of persuading victims of redistribution that their losses are neces-
sary to promote the common good.190 But to the extent that the burden 
of the action falls on a small number of unit owners, redistribution should 
not be necessary to promote the common good. The association would 
not face a heavy administrative burden if forced to compensate affected 
unit owners for the harm they suffer. Risk averse unit owners would cer-
tainly support a compensation requirement. Hence, one would expect 
courts to invalidate any measure that significantly reduces the market 
value of a particular unit or set of units, even if the association's action 
creates some community-wide benefit.191 
Ridgely Condominium Ass'n v. Smyrnioudis192 furnishes perhaps the 
best illustration. In Ridgely, a mixed-unit condominium had 232 units, 
seven of which were commercial units with access both from the outside 
and from the interior lobby of the building. After the commercial units 
were sold, the association, for security reasons, enacted a bylaw prohibit-
ing customers of the commercial units from using the interior lobby. This 
made access to those units less attractive and consequently made them 
less valuable. The court invalidated the bylaw as unreasonable.193 Of 
189 The situation might be different if the governing documents explicitly conferred 
on the majority the power to take particular actions that might have a redistributive 
effect. In that case, a reviewing court would have no basis for substituting its percep-
tion of the original understanding of the parties. In any case, these provisions pre-
sumably would be priced into the original transaction. But see KELMAN, supra note 
118, at 107-09 (noting that bundling enables one party to slip in undesirable terms 
without affecting price). 
190 See supra Part 11.B.3. 
191 If the association offered just compensation to those whose land would decline 
in value as a result of the association's proposed regulation, there would be little rea-
son to invalidate the regulation. Cf Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1536-37 (suggesting 
that courts imply taking clauses into declarations). However, whether courts should 
order compensation, rather than simply invalidate the regulation and give the associa-
tion the opportunity to draft a new regulation with compensation, is a different ques-
tion. In any event, associations appear rarely to have offered harmed landowners 
compensation for losses resulting from regulation. 
192 660 A.2d 942 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995). 
193 See id. at 951 (finding that "[t]he provision did not reasonably relate to the 
health, happiness and enjoyment of unit owners" (internal quotations omitted)). 
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course, if security had been a significant concern for the residential users, 
they could easily have compensated the seven commercial users for loss 
of lobby access. Their failure to do so made the case an easy one for the 
court. The governing principle is analogous to that which the Wilkes 
· court invoked in the close corporation context: an action that serves a 
permissible purpose-here, improving security-is nevertheless invalid if 
the same purpose could have been accomplished without harm to minori-
ty members (here, by compensating the commercial unit owners). 194 
Similarly, in Boyles v. Hausman,195 the Nebraska Supreme Court inval-
idated a covenant, affecting only a minority of landowners, that prohibit-
ed building within 120 feet of a county road. The association imposed the 
covenant after the complaining unit owner had purchased his parcel. The 
covenant significantly diminished his parcel's value. Had the association 
compensated the unit owner for the value of an easement over his parcel, 
the association's position would have been more defensible. As it was, 
however, the association's· action constituted unnecessary redistribution, 
and the court responded accordingly.196 
B. Discrimination Against Non-Resident Unit Owners 
Many community association actions are designed to promote the resi-
dential character of the community. Associations may prohibit rentals 
altogether, prohibit short-term rentals, or provide benefits to resident 
owners not equally available to non-resident owners. At first glance, ac-
tions like these appear redistributive in nature: they benefit the majority 
of resident owners at the expense of the minority of non-resident owners. 
On closer examination, however, these restrictions are far less trouble-
some, and generally should be sustained. 
A number of justifications underlie the common preference for resi-
dent owners. Resident owners may prefer other resident owners on the 
theory that, because residents have a long-term financial stake in the 
community, they are likely to work harder at maintaining their units and 
common areas, which will result in higher long-term market value for all 
units. Indeed, lenders apparently share this view, because they often con-
dition financing of associations on the maintenance of a high percentage 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 175-83. 
195 517 N.W.2d 610, 618 (Neb. 1994). 
196 The court wrote: "The law will not subject a minority of landowners to unlimit-
ed and unexpected restrictions on the use of their land merely because the covenant 
agreement permitted a majority to make changes to existing covenants." Id. at 617. 
See also Blood v. Edgar's, Inc., 632 N.E.2d 419, 420 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994), in which a 
mixed-use condominium association decided to subsidize a rental program that bene-
fited only residential unit owners. When the sole commercial owner attacked the sub-
sidy, the court held that the association had no power to alter the previous practice, 
which had been to assure that the rental program was self-sustaining. See id. at 422-
23. 
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of resident owners.197 Beyond market value, resident owners may value 
the sense of community that comes with a stable neighborhood and may 
. fear that renters-especially short-term renters-will interfere with that 
sense of community. 
If resident owners want to restrict rentals, should they be required to 
compensate non-resident owners for loss of the right to rent or for other 
disadvantages imposed on non-renters? Not necessarily. To the extent 
that restrictions on renting make the community more attractive, those 
restrictions may well increase the market value of all units, including 
those owned by non-residents. Moreover, the restrictions apply equally 
to all units, not only to units owned by non-residents, so the potential for 
redistribution is minimal. 
In addition, self-interest should restrain resident owners from imposing 
unduly onerous restrictions on renting. If rental restrictions reduce mar-
ket value, the resident owners-most of whom ultimately will want to sell 
their units-will have taken money out of their own pockets. As a result, 
resident owners will be careful to structure rental restrictions in a way 
that eliminates the negative impact on market values. 
Finally, the only interest most non-resident owners have in their units is 
a financial one. Because these owners have chosen not to live in the com-
munity, they are not likely to care about the impact rental restrictions 
(like eliminating "interesting" transients) will have on the quality of life, 
so long as that impact does not the reduce market value of their units. In 
this sense, non-resident owners are more like shareholders of a publicly 
held corporation, whose focus is almost exclusively on share value, than 
shareholders in a close corporation, whose interests typically transcend 
share price. And in publicly held corporations, in which the ultimate in-
terests of majority and minority are the same, courts generally invoke the 
business judgment rule to reject challenges to the decisions of majority-
selected officers and directors.198 
Statutes and judicial decisions generally uphold limitations on renting 
when associations set them by amending their Declarations. The 
UCIOA, for instance, permits restrictions on alienation so long as they 
are included in the Declaration.199 Courts, too, appear likely to sustain 
leasing restrictions over the objections of non-resident owners when im-
197 See Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of Commu-
nity Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB._. TR. 
J. 589, 684-86 (1993) (noting the desire of lenders to minimize the friction between 
owner-occupants and investor-owners, and to preserve their ability to sell the result-
ing mortgages on the secondary market). 
198 See supra Part V.A.2. 
199 See UNIF. CoMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP Acr § 2-105(a)(12) (1994) (stating 
that the Declaration must contain "any restrictions upon the use, occupancy, and 
alienation of the units"). 
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posed by amendment to the Declaration.200 
By contrast, the UCIOA permits associations to promulgate leasing re-
strictions by rule only if the rules are designed to comply with lender 
requirements.201 This limitation on majority power appears unnecessary 
in light of the limited threat that rental restrictions present to minority 
owners. 
The situation is different, however, if the Declaration confers on unit 
owners authorization to rent. In that instance, the association should on-
ly be able to withdraw that power by amending the Declaration itself, not 
by enacting a rule inconsistent with the Declaration. In a number of 
cases, non-resident owners have successfully challenged restrictions on 
renting when the association has attempted to circumvent rights appar-
ently conferred by the Declaration. For example, if the Declaration or 
the association bylaws provide for association review of leasing applica-
tions, courts have held that the association may not, by rule, prohibit leas-
ing altogether.202 Similarly, a California court has held that if the CC&Rs 
grant all members a right to use common areas subject to uniform associ-
ation rules, the association may not, by rule, prohibit non-resident mem-
bers from using the common facilities.203 
C. Decisions that Deprive Unit Owners of Idiosyncratic Value 
1. The Framework 
Community association decisions can have an impact-positive or neg-
200 See-McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor Ass'n, 386 S.E.2d 435 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1989) (sustaining an amendment to a Declaration that prohibited leasing for less than 
a year and forbade leasing to corporations). 
201 See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP Acr § 3-102(c)(3). 
202 See Mohnani v. La Cancha Condo. Ass'n, 590 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding invalid an association rule that placed substantial restrictions on leas-
ing, in conflict with the Declaration); Buddin v. Golden Bay Manor, Inc., 585 So. 2d 
435, 437-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a co-op could not prohibit subleas-
ing by rule when its proprietary lease and bylaws provided a mechanism for sublease 
approval). 
203 See Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass'n, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237, 243 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992) (striking down a rule that forbade non-resident owners from using associ-
ation tennis courts unless signed in by a resident who was personally present at the 
courts). In Major, the non-resident owners were family members of a senile 82-year-
old rysident who was physically incapable of using the tennis courts. See id.; see also 
Toan'!soulis v. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, 542 A.2d 900, 905 (N.J. 1988) (relying on a 
master deed provision requiring unit owners to pay a proportionate share for mainte-
nance of common elements as a basis for nullifying a rule imposing differential park-
ing rates for residents and non-residents). Major and Thanasoulis involved not 
prohibitions on renting, but unequal treatment of non-resident members. The issues 
raised, however, are closely related. If an association can prohibit leasing altogether, 
one would think it could also take the less drastic step of permitting leasing on the 
condition that the non-resident owner give up certain rights to use common facilities. 
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ative-on particular homeowners, even if those decisions have no impact 
on the market value of the units. Suppose, for instance, that an associa-
tion is about to decide whether to improve existing swimming pool facili-
ties and expand the hours during which the pool is open. Suppose further 
that these enhancements will cost $100 per year per unit owner. For Sally 
Swimmer, who would have paid $200 per year for upgraded pool facili-
ties, the proposal is attractive. Lucy Landlubber, by contrast, would not 
willingly pay even a dollar for the upgrade, because she never uses the 
facilities. Each of the other association members values the enhance-
ments somewhere between zero and $200 per year. If a majority of asso-
ciation members approves the upgrade, and approves an assessment of 
$100 per year to pay for the enhancement, should a court step in to pro-
tect Lucy, who has been made $100 per year worse off as a result of the 
association's action?204 
At first glance, one might dismiss Lucy's complaint by noting that Lucy 
could simply sell her unit and avoid the $100 annual expense. The very 
fact that a majority of unit owners supported the improvements and was 
willing to pay the annual assessment is good evidence that potential buy-
ers would find the benefit worth the cost. If the majority preferences of 
existing owners reflect the preferences of potential buyers, Lucy will not 
suffer any loss in market value as a result of the pool improvements.205 
The problem with this approach is that it denies Lucy the idiosyncratic 
204 An immediate-but incorrect-response would be to require the board to fi-
nance the improvements through user fees. One might assume that user fee assess-
ments could achieve efficiency objectives without harming other unit owners-the 
sort of test that the Wilkes court proposed in the closely held corporation context. See 
supra text accompanying notes 175-83. User fee financing, however, might provide 
too few incentives for efficient improvements to the pool, while simultaneously result-
ing in charges to members who derive no benefit from the pool. 
Assuming that the proposed pool upgrade benefits the average association member 
by $110, and that the cost of the upgrade will be $100 per unit, a user fee of $110 
might be insufficient to finance the enhancements, because some percentage of unit 
owners would not pay the user fee. Moreover, as the user fee increases, more and 
more unit owners would elect to avoid the fee by not using the pool. Unless the 
association could practice perfect price discrimination-taxing each unit owner for 
just less than the benefit that owner derives from the pool improvements-there 
would be no assurance that the association would even make the improvements. 
Moreover, even if it did, some people who placed no value at all on the improvements 
would end up paying for them. For instance, an owner who valued the improvements 
above zero, but who valued the pre-existing pool at more than $110 per year, would 
pay the user fee-bearing a cost that produced no benefit to him. User fees, then, do 
not eliminate the risk that some unit owners will pay for benefits enjoyed by others. 
205 The assumption is that the pool improvements are equally accessible to all unit 
owners, differentiating this case from those in which particular decisions benefit some 
unit owners and harm others. See supra text accompanying notes 185-87. 
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value she almost certainly attaches to her unit. 206 Econ:omic theory 
teaches that all current owners of housing (and, for that matter, other 
assets) value their units more than the market does; if they did not, they 
would be indifferent to selling their units and moving or remaining. With 
housing, there is a particularly good reason for assuming that owners at-
tach idiosyncratic value to their units: moving is costly, both in terms of 
finances as well as changed affiliations (new schools, new neighbors) and 
personal attachments.207 In other words, the cost of "exit" for Lucy is 
high, often higher than the loss she might suffer at the association's 
hands. 
Lucy's predicament is not the "bundling" problem she would face when 
deciding whether to purchase a unit with a swimming pool she does not 
want.208 In that situation, Lucy would not yet have formed the attach-
ments that make leaving difficult in the case where the association ap-
proves pool renovations after she has lived in the community for a time. 
Moreover, because Lucy's attachments in the latter situation lock her into 
her current unit, she has less incentive to make an informed decision 
about pool improvements than if she was deciding whether to buy in the 
first place.209 
Focusing on Lucy's predicament, however, obscures the advantages of 
sustaining the association's action. First, there is good reason to believe 
that the majority's gains will exceed the minority's losses. Sheer numbers 
do not capture intensity of preferences, but in the case of community as-
sociation decisions, those with intense preferences have two alternatives: 
they can seek to influence the association's decision, or they can move: 
The first option is likely to be more effective in the community associa-
tion context than in the close corporation, because majority members of 
the association must confront members of the minority on a regular ba-
sis-in the neighborhood or when using common facilities. Regular con-
tacts like these would be quite uncomfortable if it was clear that the ma-
jority was ignoring strongly held preferences of the minority. Thus, the 
majority will be more inclined to compromise than in the close corpora-
206 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1525 (noting that redistributive policies can have 
bite whenever a member "is obtaining irreplaceable surplus value (perhaps as a result 
of a long-lived membership)"). 
207 See Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) 
( discussing the impossibility of compensating the loss of highly personal value). 
208 See supra Part III.BJ. 
209 See Bebchuck, supra note 141, at 1828-29. In discussing amendments to char-
ters of publicly held corporations, Bebchuck notes that, at the time of the original 
charter, a purchaser who does not like its provisions can take them into account when 
deciding whether to purchase. However, at the amendment stage, a shareholder can-
not escape the consequences of a value-decreasing amendment. Bebchuck further 
points out that a stock purchaser has a much greater incentive to make an informed 
decision than does a voting shareholder, because the voter's decision is not likely to 
be pivotal. See id. at 1837. · · 
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tion context, in which the majority could, absent legal constraints, simply 
"freeze out" minority shareholders.210 
In addition, because units in a common interest community are readily 
marketable-unlike minority interests in close corporations-the exit op-
tion furnishes the ultimate safety valve for dissident residents of a com-
mon interest community. So long as the association's actions do not re-
distribute market value from some units to others, those who are 
particularly unhappy with the association's decision know that, at worst, 
they can sell their unit at the market price.~11 Moving would result in a 
loss of idiosyncratic value, but there is no way to protect both the minori-
ty's intense preferences and its idiosyncratic value without imposing par-
allel-and presumptively larger-costs on the majority. That is, if we as-
sume that some members of the majority are at least as likely to have 
intense preferences as members of the minority, annulling the associa-
tion's action would put the former to the same choice. Either they could 
stay, their intense preferences ignored, or they could leave, losing 
whatever idiosyncratic value they attach to their units. Collective action 
problems make it virtually impossible to solve the dilemma by compen-
sating minority members. As long as the losses the minority suffers are 
not reflected in market value, no readily available mechanism exists for 
determining what compensation should be paid, or who should pay it.212 
Two analogies to close corporation law suggest that the majority ought 
to prevail in cases like Lucy's. First, we have seen that even in a close 
corporation case like Wilkes, in which the court protected a minority 
shareholder against a freeze-out, the court indicated that the majority 
210 Cf HIRSCHMAN, supra note 60, at 40-41 (noting that "voice is costly and condi-
tioned on the influence and bargaining power customers and members can bring to 
bear within the ... organizations to which they belong"). The potential for freeze-
outs reduces bargaining power, and hence, the potential for voice within a close cor-
poration. By contrast, to the extent minority residents of a common interest commu-
nity can exercise bargaining power simply by making majority members uncomforta-
ble in their daily lives, minority members with intense preferences have more 
opportunity to exercise a "voice" in association decisions. Clayton Gillette has noted 
that an association is unlikely to take an action against any Ininority residents unless 
their behavior is extraordinarily bothersome to the majority: 
A board of directors is unlikely to bring a costly and time-consuming action in 
the association's name until it has heard multiple complaints against a neighbor, 
made in independent investigation, and attempted informal resolution of the 
matter. Where the association decides to proceed, therefore, it is unlikely that 
the complainers have been idiosyncratic. 
Gillette, supra note 122, at 1422-23. 
211 The assumption here is. that the association's decision will not reduce market 
value; that is, that self-interested association members will not enact measures that 
reduce the value of all units in the community. 
· 212 Cf Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 CoLUM.· L. REv. 55, 
74-75 (1987) (noting that, in the absence of markets, no reliable mechanism exists for 
establishing value to parties). 
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shareholders would be entitled to disadvantage the minority shareholder 
if they could not accomplish their legitimate business purpose without 
harming the minority shareholder.213 If a community association cannot 
accomplish a purpose of importance to a majority of unit owners without 
diminishing the idiosyncratic value of minority unit owners, the Wilkes 
principle suggests that the majority should prevail. 
Second, a number of states have enacted statutes authorizing dissolu-
tion of close corporations when those in control have oppressed minority 
shareholders.214 These statutes permit controlling shareholders to avoid 
dissolution by purchasing the shares of the minority shareholders at a fair 
price.215 In effect, then, a dissenting shareholder who establishes that her 
expectations of corporate office or employment have been unjustifiably 
frustrated by the majority's action is entitled to recover only the market 
value of her shares, not whatever idiosyncratic value she attached• to her 
job or affiliation with the company. There is good reason for denying 
dissenting shareholders (and dissenting unit owners) compensation for 
lost idiosyncratic value: that value is notoriously difficult to measure.216 
To the extent these analogies to close corporation law are appropriate, 
they suggest that those who join an association generally expect that the 
association could pursue policies that most members would find benefi-
cial, so long as those policies do not redistribute market value among 
units.217 On the other hand, this presumption of association power 
should serve merely as a default rule. When parties have revealed expec-
213 See supra text accompanying notes 175-83. 
214 See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE§ 1800(a)(2), (b)(4) (West 1990) (providing share-
holders a remedy of involuntary dissolution where those in control of the corporation 
engage in "persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement or abuse of authority or 
persistent unfairness toward any shareholders," or waste or misapply corporate prop-
erty); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 1986) (permitting shareholders to 
petition for dissolution when the directors, or other control persons, engage in "ille-
gal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the complaining shareholders," or "prop-
erty or assets of the corporation are being looted, wasted or diverted for non-corpo-
rate purposes"). 
215 See CAL. CORP. CoDE § 2000(a); N.Y. Bus CORP. LAW§ 1118(a). 
216 In part for that reason, landowners are not entitled to idiosyncratic value when 
government takes their land for public use. See United States v. 564.54 A.cres of 
Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("Because of serious practical difficulties in assessing 
the worth an individual places on particular property at a given time, we have recog-
nized the need for a relatively objective working rule .... The Court therefore has 
employed the concept of fair market value to determine the condemnee's loss .... "). 
But cf Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance.. Rules, and 
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 736-37 (1973) (proposing legisla-
tively defin~d compensation for lost surplus value). 
217 But cf Natelson, supra note 15, at 69-70 (suggesting that prospective members 
would only agree to regulations that would hold them harmless from all losses, with-
out distinguishing between market value losses and other losses). 
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tations that association power is limited, those expectations' should be 
honored. 218 
The most obvious way for parties to reveal their expectations about the 
scope of association power is to make them explicit in the documents 
creating the association. Thus, if the Declaration limits association power 
to alter appurtenances without unanimous approval of record owners, an 
association majority should not be able to convert a tennis court into a 
parking area.219 Similarly, the Declaration can limit the power of the 
association board by requiring supermajorities for particular actions.220 
Moreover, if the Declaration explicitly permits particular landowner ac-
tivities, one would not expect that an association could prohibit those ac-
tivities without amendment to the Declaration. Simply enacting a rule 
should be insufficient.221 
Even when the Declaration is silent about association behavior, if a 
unit owner makes a substantial and obvious investment, either financial 
or emotional, with the expectation, created by existing association struc-
ture, that certain behavior would be permitted, the association should be 
estopped from regulating that behavior if it took no steps to stop the unit 
owner from making the investment. Property law often protects expecta-
tions, whether or not reduced to a writing, when a party has made invest-
ments that all parties understand he would not have made but for the 
expectation.222 Zoning law's non-conforming use doctrines provide simi-
218 Professor Ellickson has suggested that unit owners should be compensated for 
lost idiosyncratic value, measured by "an amount equal to what a 'reasonable person' 
in the claimant's particular life situation would lose in irreplaceable surplus." Ellick-
son, supra note 1, at 1538. How that amount would be measured in the case of a 
prospective prohibition on pets or aluminum siding is difficult to imagine. Indeed, 
virtually any unit owner might make a claim. Professor Ellickson's illustration-"fer-
tile young couples who had joined the association in reliance on an express policy 
allowing children"-is one of those cases in which, by hypothesis, there has been reli-
ance on past policy and harm is therefore assumed. Hence, as suggested below, the 
association should be estopped from enforcing the restriction. See infra Part V.C.2. 
Incidentally, the particular restriction Professor Ellickson used to illustrate his point 
has been rendered moot by the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act. See 42 
U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994) (outlawing discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling 
on the basis of ''familial status"). 
219 See Gilmore v. Ciega Verde Condo. Ass'n, 601 So. 2d 1325, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1992) (rejecting an association's attempt to convert a tennis court into a parking 
lot without the unanimous consent of its residents, as required by its CC&Rs); Young 
v. Ciega Verde Condo. Ass'n, 600 So. 2d 528, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (same). 
220 See generally Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1533-34 ( discussing the utility of 
supermajorities in limiting association power). 
221 See, e.g., Parkway Gardens Condo. Ass'n v Kinser, 536 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1988) (holding unenforceable a rule prohibiting pets when the Declaration 
permitted them). 
222 American property law generally imposes on neighbors the obligation to coop-
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lar protection for expectations: if a party develops land for a particular 
use, subsequent zoning regulation changes do not generally require im-
mediate cessation of the pre-existing use.223 The same principles should 
serve to limit community association action. For instance, if a unit owner 
erected a satellite dish or installed a washer and dryer without any notice 
that these devices were prohibited, courts could appropriately enjoin the 
association from enforcing any subsequently enacted prohibition against 
that unit owner. Similarly, a prohibition on pets even if enforceable pro-
spectively, ought not to require a particular unit owner to part with a pet 
acquired without notice of any restriction. 
2. The Case Law 
A focus on unit owner expectations leads to the conclusion that associ-
ation actions should be upheld unless either there is clear indication that 
a unit owner expected protection against a particular kind of association 
rule, or the association has adopted rules that redistribute value from 
some units to others. The case law generally, albeit imperfectly, reflects 
this framework. This section examines the judicial approach to these 
questions in the areas of assessments, design controls, and lifestyle re-
strictions. 
a. Assessments 
So long as no express language in the Declaration limits the associa-
tion's power to impose assessments on unit owners, and so long as the 
association does not use assessments to redistribute the market value of 
units, one would expect courts routinely to enforce assessments despite 
the complaints of unit owners who would prefer to avoid them. Indeed, 
because an individual who successfully escapes his obligation to pay an 
assessment can nevertheless free-ride on the payments of other unit own-
ers, one would expect courts to · be especially reluctant to upset assess-
erate with each other. See generally Sterk, supra note 212, at 95-103 (discussing the. 
scope of the obligation). In particular, a neighbor generally may not stand silent 
while his neighbor makes substantial investments, and then require the neighbor to 
forfeit those investments. See id. at 59-63 ( discussing various easement and boundary 
dispute doctrines that protect neighbors who have made substantial investments in 
reliance on an understanding, sometimes mistaken, about their right to use their 
land). Presumably, the obligation to cooperate should be even stronger in the com-
munity association context, in which the parties have a continuing formal legal rela-
tion, as well as a social relation as neighbors. 
223 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 125.583a(l) (1996): 
The lawful use of land or a structure exactly as the land or structure existed at the 
time of the enactment of the ordinance affecting that land or structure, may be 
continued, except as otherwise provided in this act, although that use or structure 
does not conform with the ordinance. 
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men ts ( as compared with other association actions that generate less po-
tential for free-riding). 
In fact, courts have become increasingly inclined to enforce associa-
tion-imposed assessments. In. one oft-cited 1971 case, Petersen v. Beek-
mere, Inc. ,224 a New Jersey court refused to enforce an express covenant 
that required unit owners to pay dues and assessments to the association, 
expressing concern about leaving unit owners at the mercy of the associa-
tion.. More recent cases in New Jersey and elsewhere have enforced ex-
press covenants requiring unit owners to pay dues and assessments.225 
Indeed, courts have implied association power to impose assessments, 
even when the Declaration is silent as to such power.226 The stated ra-
tionale generally has been that a unit owner who subjects himself to asso-
ciation power has notice and an expectation that the association may re-
quire financial support for the maintenance of common facilities.227 
Perhaps more significant to these outcomes, however, is the built-in insti-
224 283 A.2d 911, 920~21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971). 
225 See, e.g., Paulinkill Lake Ass'n v. Emmich, 397 A.2d 698,699 (N.J. 1978) (en-
forcing a covenant requiring all property owners to pay their share of the costs of 
maintaining the community); see also Cerro de Alcala Homeowners Ass'n v. Burns, . 
216 Cal. Rptr. 84, 86 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that an abandoning 
condominium owner is nevertheless responsible for. assessments); Chattahoochee 
Chase Condo. Ass'n v. Ruben, 472 S.E.2d 520, 522 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (noting gener-
ally that "collective owners of a condominium unit are liable for the unit's portion of 
the total assessment levied by the Association on all units"). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.5 (Preliminary Draft No. 12, Sept. 20, 
1995), entitled "Assessments and Fees," which provides in part: 
Except as expressly limited by statute or the governing documents, an association 
has the power to raise the funds reasonably necessary to carry out its functions by 
levying assessments against the individually owned property in the community 
and by charging fees for services or use of the common property. 
In the absence of a controlling statute or provision in the governing docu-
ments, assessments may be allocated among the individually owned properties on 
any reasonable basis, and are secured by a lien against the individually owned 
properties. 
226 See, e.g., Meadow Run & Mt. Lake Park Ass'n v. Berkel, 598 A.2d 1024, 1026 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding that an indication in the Declaration that an association 
might be formed in the future was sufficient to bind unit owners to assessments later 
imposed by that association); cf. William W. Bond, Jr. & Assoc., Inc. v. Lake O' the 
Hills Maintenance Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 1043, 1045 (Miss. 1990) (holding that the associa-
tion's failure to insert the amount of its annual assessment in the deed did not excuse 
a property owner from paying the amount assessed). 
227 See Meadow Run, 598 A.2d at 1026: 
This deed, while making no mention of an assessment, does put appellants on 
notice that should an association of lot owners be formed in the future, they 
would be bound by any rules the association adopted concerning usage of devel-
opment facilities. Implied in the existence of rules and regulations concerning 
usage of the facilities is the necessity for rules and regulations concerning mainte-
nance of these facilities. 
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tutional protection against abuse: the majority of association members 
would have little reason to impose assessments that would devalue their 
own properties. 
Courts have even sustained assessments that differentiate between unit 
owners, so long as the association proffers a plausible justification for the 
differential assessments. Thus, in Weatherby Lake Improvement Co. v. 
Sherman,228 in which the association sought to pay for improvements to a 
dam and spillway by requiring owners of improved waterfront lots to pay 
40% more than owners of unimproved lots without lake frontage, the , 
court approved the assessments over the objection of an interior lot own-
er who complained that waterfront owners should have been required to 
pay even more.229 
Conversely, when an association levies an assessment for services that 
provide no benefit to a well-defined minority of unit owners, courts rec-
ognize that, even if the assessment is applied equally to all unit owners, 
this form of redistribution was not within the contemplation of the par-
ties. Thus, in Blood v. Edgar's, Inc. ,230 the court invalidated an assess-
ment that would have required all unit owners, residential and commer-
cial alike, to support a rental operation that benefited only the residential 
owners. 
To the extent that courts treat association assessment power as an im-
plied term in the agreement between landowners, one would expect 
courts to respect express limitations on this power. In one significant 
case, however, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld an association's pow-
er to impose a one-time special assessment in excess of express assess-
ment limits included in the Declaration. In Lake Tishimongo Property 
Owners Ass'n v. Cronin,231 the court noted that the Declaration made no 
provision for amendment, and that members of the association had voted 
2-1 ,in favor of an assessment to finance the dredging of a lake in which 
228 611 S.W.2d 326, 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting a claim that an assessment 
was unreasonable because it imposed an excessive burden on lot owners who would 
benefit the least from the improvements). 
229 The court quoted a 1918 opinion in which the Missouri Supreme Court wrote: 
It is true exact equality in apportioning the burdens of improvements is beyond 
human wisdom, and no heed will be given complaints against a rule which ap-
proximates justice as nearly as reasonably may be. Exceptional cases of har<lship 
in the natural and ordinary application of a principal [sic] of apportionment gen-
erally fair and just must be borne as one of the imperfections of human things. 
Id. at 332 (quoting Commerce Trust Co. v. Blakely, 202 S.W. 402,404 (Mo. 1918)). In 
Weatherby Lake, the association had approved three levels of assessment: the basic 
assessment for unimproved interior lots, a 20% premium for improved interior lots 
and unimproved waterfront lots, and a 40% premium for improved waterfront lots. 
See id. at 330. 
230 632 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). 
231 679 S.W.2d 852, 857 (Mo. 1984) (en bane). 
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sediments had accumulated.232 Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from 
Lake Tishimongo is that parties can never anticipate all issues that will 
arise over the long term. As a result, if a multi-party agreement makes 
no express . provision for modification in light of unanticipated events, 
courts will imply an understanding that modification is appropriate in 
light of unanticipated contingencies.233 
b. Design Controls 
Design controls are among the most litigated of association actions. 
Often, the governing documents of a community association create an 
architectural review committee with the power to review plans for struc-
tures or improvements within the community. The function of the archi-
tectural review committee is to maintain the community's character and 
to preserve values within the cQmmunity. Even when the governing doc-
uments create no architectural control committee, an association might 
enact rules prohibiting certain structures or activities thought to interfere 
with the community's function or aesthetics. Frequently, the association 
or committee ends up in disputes with unit owners who have their own 
ideas about aesthetics or function. 
When the basis for the association's rejection of a proposed structure 
or modification rests on a rule that the association applies to all units 
within the community, courts generally should enforce the association's 
decision. So long as restrictions apply equally to all unit owners, they are 
unlikely to have any redistributive effect. Moreover, the self-interest of 
association members provides an institutional protection against enact-
ment of restrictions that would reduce market value. Again, a majority of 
unit owners is unlikely to support restrictions that would make them 
worse off. Hence, unless the governing documents provide otherwise, the 
association's generally applicable rules should be enforceable. 
Many, but not all, courts have taken this position. For example, in Gill-
man v. Pebble Cove Home Owners Ass'n,234 the court upheld an associa-
tion's right to prohibit parking on the development's private streets.235 In 
232 See id. at 854. 
233 The principle resembles the rationale for the "changed conditions" doctrine in 
servitude law. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: 
The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 lowA L. REv. 615, 652-54 (1985) 
( explaining that the changed conditions doctrine prevents enforcement of servitudes 
when conditions have changed to such a degree as to m.ake enforcement impossible or 
inequitable). On the inadequacy of foresight as a justification for restricting contrac-
tual freedom in servitude law, see id. at 631-34 and Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the 
Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 956, 957-61 (1988). But see Epstein, supra 
note 5, at 923 (arguing that "there is no need for any public doctrine of changed 
conditions to limit the scope and effect of private covenants"). 
234 546 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
235 See also Forest Hills Gardens Corp. v. Baroth, 555 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (N.Y. 
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O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condominium Ass'n,236 the court held 
that the association had the right to prohibit outdoor television antennas. 
And in Dunlap v. Bavarian Village Condominium Ass'n,237 the court sus-
tained a rule prohibiting storage of vehicles on the premises. 
Results are similar when the governing documents delegate decision 
making authority to an architectural control committee. Thus, in Mc-
Namee v. Bishop Trust Co. ,238 the court upheld a committee's decision to 
prohibit a twcr-story addition in a community made up exclusively of one-
story homes. In Coral Gables Investments, Inc. v. Graham Cos. ,239 the 
court upheld a prohibition on fiberglass shingles. And in Palos Verdes 
Homes Ass'n v. Rodman,240 the court upheld a committee policy requir-
ing that solar heating units meet detailed specifications. In each of these 
cases, the committee or association had applied its prohibition across the 
board. 
By contrast, a few courts have refused to enforce blanket prohibitions 
on certain kinds of structures, finding that the provision for architectural 
control provided insufficient notice to unit owners of the committee's 
power to prohibit particular structures241 or expressing antipathy to regu-
lation of aesthetics.242 Thus, courts have invalidated bans on vinyl sid-
ing,243 factory-built homes,244 and above-ground pools.245 
When an association's design prohibition rules have not been applied 
across the board, courts should be, and are, much less likely to uphold the 
association's action. Unless a common interest community has, from its 
inception, featured distinctly different types of units in different areas, 
Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that a residential community owner had the right to immobi-
lize unauthorized parked vehicles). 
236 750 P.2d 813, 814 (Alaska 1988). 
237 780 P.2d 1012, 1016-17 (Alaska 1989). 
238 616 P.2d 205, 213 (Haw. 1980). 
239 528 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
240 227 Cal. Rptr. 81, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
241 See, e.g., Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, 593 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ill. App .. Ct. 
1992) (invalidating a blanket rule against above-ground swimming pools when the 
covenant did not specifically prohibit these structures). 
242 See, e.g., Point Farm Homeowner's Ass'n v. Evans, No. 1505, 1993 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 110, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 28, 1993) (noting that architectural review is unrea-
sonable to the extent that it is "based on purely aesthetical considerations"). 
243 See id. at *10-*11 (holding unenforceable a restriction against vinyl siding im-
posed for purely aesthetic reasons). 
244 See Chesapeake Estates Improvement Ass'n v. Foster, 288 A.2d 329,333 (Md. 
1972) (invalidating a restriction against modular homes because such homes were not 
specifically prohibited in the covenant). 
245 See Westfield Homes, 593 N.E.2d at 102 (holding a blanket restriction against 
above-ground pools unreasonable); see also Kies v. Hollub, 450 So. 2d 251, 256 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating an association decision to ban. light poles on tennis 
courts for aesthetic reasons). 
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few purchasers would expect that an association would prohibit them 
from using desigri features permitted elsewhere in the community.246 
Moreover, if decisionmakers themselves do not suffer the burdens of a 
restriction they impose on others, there is no institutional safeguard 
against the redistribution of market value. These principles are reflected 
in cases like Indian Hills Club Homeowners Ass'n v. Cooper,247 in which 
the court invalidated the association's attempt to enjoin a unit owner 
from building a driveway apron, noting that many other homes had simi-
lar aprons. Similarly, in Young v. Tortoise Island Homeowners Ass'n,248 
the court held that the association could not prevent a unit owner from 
using a flat roof when a number of other homes in the community also 
had flat roofs.249 
Concern for inequitable enforcement-and consequent redistribu-
tion-also leads to greater judicial scrutiny of design controls when a de-
sign committee's decisions do not rest on any rule, but rather on an amor-
phous sfandard such as a requirement that new structures harmonize with 
pre-existing ones. Some courts suggest that standards like these-may be 
unenforceable per se.250 Most examine the board or committee decision 
to assure that the decision addressed an identifiable evil.251 
Finally, when there is strong evidence that a particular design control 
would frustrate a unit owner's expectations, courts are reluctant to en-
force the control. When, for instance, the CC&Rs expr~ssly prohibit cer-
246 Of course, if a community has been developed in part with townhouse units and 
in part with single-family homes on large lots, purchasers might expect that some 
restrictions applicable to one sort of unit would not be applicable to the other. 
247 No. 0lA0l-9507-CH-00319, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 832, at *15-*16 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Dec. 29, 1995). 
248 511 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
249 See also Jackson Square Town House Homes Ass'n v. Mims, 393 So. 2d 816, 
818 (La. App. 1981) (invalidating a blanket prohibition against building new storage 
sheds when the covenant permitted outbuildings). Of course, deciding whether simi-
lar uses pervade the community is not always an easy matter. Thus, in Killearn Acres 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Keever, 595 So. 2d 1019, 1021-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), the 
court upheld the architectural control committee's right to prohibit a satellite dish, 
even though the community association had taken no action against eight other dishes 
in the community of more than 700 units. The court noted that the other dishes were 
located in areas less visible from the street than that of the complaining unit owner. 
See id. 
25° Cf Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 740 P.2d 669, 671 (Mont. 1987) 
(finding that a covenant requiring "harmony of external design" was not per se am-
biguous). 
251 See, e.g., Normandy Square Ass'n v. Ellis, 327 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Neb. 1982) 
(noting fence's ugliness and distance from sidewalk). But see Souza v. Columbia Park 
& Recreation Ass'n, 522 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (upholding an 
architectural committee's decision based on nothing more than adherence to a gener-
al development plan). 
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tain kinds of structures, a number of courts have held that an architectur-
al control committee may not enact a blanket prohibition of other 
structures.252 The premise is that unit owners could reasonably expect 
that only the listed structures would be absolutely prohibited, and that 
other proposed structures would have to be evaluated for their effect on 
the community. Similarly, a few courts have invoked estoppel-like princi-
ples to preclude an association from imposing new restrictions when unit 
owners have made expenditures in reliance on an apparent right to make 
the disputed improvement.253 
c. Lifestyle Restrictions 
Community associations are sometimes depicted as Orwellian "Big 
Brothers" that intrude into the personal lives of their members.254 One 
can conjure up a variety of association rules that might interfere with the 
autonomy of individual residents, like restrictions on clothing, prohibi-
tions on homosexual activity, limitations on political advocacy, or re-
quirements of religious conformity. Lifestyle restrictions of this sort raise 
two important questions. First, do association rules inappropriately ex-
clude members of disfavored groups from the housing market? Second, 
do those rules inappropriately constrain the personal freedoms of those 
who do buy units within the community? 
Over the last several decades, concern about exclusion qf disfavored 
groups from the housing market has led to state and federal legislation 
limiting the power of housing purveyors to choose with whom they deal. 
Much of this legislation limits the power of community associations to 
252 See Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, 593 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(finding that homeowners were entitled to rely on the fact that above-ground swim-
ming pools were not specifically prohibited in the covenant); Point Farm Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Evans, No. 1505, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *4, *10 (Del. Ch. June 28, 
1993) (holding that when the covenant contained detailed provisions for stick-built 
homes, minimum roof pitch, and setback, and prohibited television towers and satel-
lite systems, its silence as to types of siding foreclosed the association's absolute pro-
hibition of vinyl siding). 
253 See First Hyland Greens Ass'n v. Griffith, 618 P.2d 745, 747 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1980) (holding that, although an association did not approve a homeowner's plan to 
construct a pool house, the association was estopped from denying that its decision 
could be construed as permission to construct a pool house meeting covenant specifi-
cations); Seabreak Homeowners Ass'n v. Gresser, 517 A.2d 263, 270-71 (Del. Ch. 
1986) (invalidating an association's prohibition against new construction when the 
homeowners acted under a reasonable but incorrect belief that their project would be 
approved and had made substantial expenditures). 
254 See, e.g., David Willman, Woman Faces Fine for Kissing Her Date, L.A. TIMES, 
June 16, 1991, at A3 (reporting a woman's feeling of being "controlled" and 
"watched" by her neighbors in a community association that sa.nctioned her for kiss-
ing a man). 
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exclude or discriminate against members of protected groups.255 By the 
same token, the legislation continues to permit housing purveyors-in-
cluding home sellers and landlords-to discriminate among consumers on 
bases other than those enumerated in the statutes.256 Although a plausi-
ble case could be made for expanding the protection of the fair housing 
laws, there is little reason to impose on associations stricter prohibitions 
against exclusion than those that apply to other housing purveyors.257 In-
deed, given the interdependence of community association members and 
their sharing of common facilities, one might argue that community as-
sociations should enjoy a greater measure of freedom to choose associ-
ates than generally would be available to individual sellers or land-
lords. 258 
What, then, of the effect of lifestyle restrictions on persons who buy 
within the community? The issue is not whether some broad public poli-
cy entitles unit owners to engage in activities the community association 
wants to restrict. Whether unit owners should be permitted to waive 
"rights" to engage in activities in their own homes could easily be re-
solved by reference to landlord-tenant law. If courts would enforce a 
lease provision barring signs in a window, or pets, or abortion counseling, 
there is little reason to prevent unit owners from waiving comparable 
"rights." 
Instead, the significant question is whether association restrictions, oft-
en enacted after purchase of individual units, frustrate the expectations 
held by a minority of unit owners at the time they initially bought units 
within the community. The UCIOA clearly reflects a fear that associa-
tion restrictions have significant potential to frustrate minority expecta-
255 For instance, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994), makes it unlaw-
. ful "[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale 
or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision or services or facilities in connection there-
with, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." A com-
munity association would clearly violate the statute if it were to enact rules barring 
women or children, or banning the wearing of hats (including yarmulkes) in common 
areas. See also CAL. Gov'T CooE § 12955 (West 1992) (prohibiting housing discrimi-
nation); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296 (Consol. 1996) (same). 
256 See, e.g., Kramarsky v. Stahl Management, 401 N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1977) (sustaining a landlord's alleged practice of discriminating against lawyers: 
"Absent a supervening statutory prescription, a landlord is free to do what he wishes 
with his property, and to rent or not to rent to any given person at his whim."). 
257 Gregory Alexander has argued that courts should regulate community associa-
tions to protect against exclusion and domination. See Alexander, supra note 60, at 
37-39. Alexander suggests that the problem of domination is neither limited to racial 
discrimination nor, presumably, to other forms of discrimination prohibited by posi-
tive law. See id. at 37. Alexander does not suggest, however, why community associa-
tions should be more constrained in their power to exclude than, say, landlords. 
258 Indeed, even the Fair Housing Act makes allowances for rentals in owner-occu-
pied dwellings that house four or fewer families. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1994). 
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tions. Thus, the UCIOA prohibits restrictions on use of individual units 
unless the restrictions are included in the Declaration,259 and requires an 
80% supermajority to amend the Declaration to restrict uses within indi-
vidual units. 260 
The wisdom of the hurdles the UCIOA places before community as-
sociations seeking to respond to unit owner preferences remains an open 
question. In general, lifestyle restrictions should not pose a significant 
threat to unit owner expectations. First, the self-interest of the majority 
of owners provides institutional protection against value-decreasing re-
strictions. At the same time, across-the-board restrictions on lifestyle 
present little opportunity for redistribution of market value; if one unit 
was to decline in market value as a consequence of a restriction on speech 
or pets, all units would be likely to suffer a decline. Hence, associations 
are unlikely to promulgate value-decreasing lifestyle restrictions.261 
Second, at the time of purchase, prospective unit owners seem unlikely 
to expect judicial protection from lifestyle restrictions that do not dimin-
ish the market value of any units and enhance the idiosyncratic value 
most unit owners attach to their units. This is especially so when prospec-
tive owners know that they will have the opportunity to voice opposition 
to the restriction, and, at worst, to sell their units and exit the community. 
Of course, expectations in particular cases might be different. The 
question is what evidence should be sufficient to establish an expectation 
that particular lifestyle restrictions would not be imposed. In general, ex-
press language in the governing documents or the association's failure to 
respond to a unit purchaser's reliance on pre-existing rules would provide 
good evidence of an understanding that the association would not later 
enact restrictions inconsistent with those rules. 
Existing practice and decided cases bear out much of this analytical 
framework. First, litigated cases about restrictions on speech (including 
signs), on sexual conduct, on religious practices, or on other fundamental 
lifestyle issues are virtually nonexistent. The absence of cases suggests 
that when community associations enact or enforce restrictions of this 
sort, residents generally are pleased with them. At the same time, the 
absence of cases also suggests that associations may eschew more extreme 
restrictions, either out of concern about their effect on market value or 
out of opposition to such restrictions on personal freedom. 
Second, with respect to more commonly promulgated lifestyle restric-
259 See UNrF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT§ 3-102(c) (1994). 
260 See id. § 2-117(f). 
261 Leading community association practitioners report that restrictions on signs 
and access to the community (prohibiting solicitation and canvassing) are quite com-
mon. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 197, at 686-88. They argue that sign re-
strictions prevent the appearance of instability that might have a negative effect on 
property values, and that access restrictions provide desirable security and privacy to 
community residents. 
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tions such as prohibitions on pets or alcohol consumption in common ar-
eas, courts generally uphold prospective regulations, although some insist 
that those restrictions be incorporated into the association's Declaration 
or bylaws. There is, for instance, nearly universal agreement that if a 
community association includes a pet prohibition in its Declaration or 
association bylaws, the prohibition is enforceable.262 Courts divide, how-
ever, about whether an association may prohibit pets by rule. A number 
of courts have enforced prohibition by rule,263 but in recent years courts 
in Illinois and Massachusetts have invalidated association rules prohibit-
ing pets, relying on state statutes providing that "restrictions on and re-
quirements respecting the use and maintenance of ... units" be included 
in the bylaws.264 But as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has 
observed, the requirement that pet restrictions be included in the bylaws 
is a "technicality" which "may be corrected by appropriate action of the 
unit owners."265 Of course, amendment of the bylaws may be a more 
cumbersome process than mere promulgation of a rule. This perhaps as-
sures. some degree of deliberation before an association imposes signifi-
cant lifestyle restrictions on neighbors with different values.266 The ulti-
mate conclusion, however, is that an association may enact a prohibition 
on pets even if the original Declaration does not address the issue. 
At the same time, courts have been unwilling to sustain pet prohibi-
tions, that are inconsistent with the Declaration. Thus, if the Declaration 
expressly contemplates that unit owners can keep pets, the association 
may not, by rule, prohibit pets.267 Moreover, a Colorado court has held 
262 See, e.g., Nahrestedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290-91 
(Cal. 1994) (upholding as reasonable a pet prohibition in condominium bylaws); Pines 
of Boca Harwood Condo. Ass'n v. Cavouti, 605 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992) (finding a pet restriction in a Declaration to be neither unreasonable nor im-
proper); Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266,268 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (upholding an 
absolute pet restriction in a Declaration). 
263 See, e.g., Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v O'Brey, 418 A.2d 1233, 1235 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (holding a dog restriction to be enforceable, and noting 
that "courts have adopted a hard-line approach and have upheld condominium board 
of directors' regulations as to dogs ... as being reasonable and enforceable"). 
264 See Board of Dir. of 175 E. Delaware Place Homeowners Ass'n v. Hinojosa, 
No. 1-95-2262, 1996 Ill. App. Ct. LEXIS 323, at *19 (Ill. App. Ct. May 3, 1996) (hold-
ing that an association was not authorized by Illinois statute to restrict by board rule 
ownership of dogs); Granby Heights Ass'n v. Dean, 647 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Mass. 1995) 
(holding unenforceable an association rule prohibiting pets outside of individual 
units); Johnson v Keith, 331 N.E.2d 879,880,883 (Mass.1975) (holding unenforceable 
an association rule prohibiting pets). 
265 Johnson, 331 N.E.2d at 882. 
266 See supra Part II.B.2. 
267 See Parkway Gardens Condo. Ass'n v. Kinser, 536 So. 2d 1076, 1076 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1988) (per curium) (holding that a condominium Declaration allowing pets 
trumped subsequent association rules and regulations prohibiting pets). 
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that if the Declaration permits a unit owner to keep a pet with the per-
mission of the association board, the association may not, by rule or by-
law, promulgate a blanket prohibition on pets.268 Instead, the association 
must evaluate each application on a case-by-case basis. 
In addition, when unit owners have acquired pets in reliance on the 
absence of a pet prohibition, associations often "grandfather" existing 
pets while prohibiting new ones. 269 And when an association does seek 
to apply a pet prohibition retroactively, a court is less likely to sustain the 
association's action.270 Although pet prohibitions are the most frequently 
litigated of lifestyle restrictions, courts also have sustained activity restric-
tions that might impinge on the lifestyle of some residents, such as the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages in common areas271 or the installa-
tion of satellite dishes and television antennas.272 
D. Summary 
Although community associations could promulgate rules that cause 
significant harm to individual unit owners, institutional constraints sub-
stantially reduce the risk of harm. So long as association rules have a 
similar impact on all units, those rules are not likely to have an adverse 
impact on the units' market value. A majority of landowners would be 
unlikely to promulgate a rule that made them all worse off. The principal 
harm an individual unit owner is likely to suffer when the association 
promulgates a rule applicable to all unit owners is a loss of the idiosyn-
cratic value she attaches to her unit. That loss, however, will be 
matched-and generally exceeded-by a gain to other unit owners, and 
in most cases there will be no way to generate the gain without also im-
268 See Chateau Village N. Condo. Ass'n v. Jordan, 643 P.2d 791, 792 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1982). 
269 See, e.g., Winston Towers 200 Ass'n v. Saverio, 360 So. 2d 470, 470-71 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1978) (per curium) (holding unenforceable a bylaw prohibiting the replace-
ment of pets). Some associations go a step further, permitting purchasers with pets to 
move into the association so long as they do not replace the pets when they die. See, 
e.g., Wilshire Condo. Ass'n v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979) (upholding a bylaw that permitted purchasers to move in with pets but prohibit-
ed replacement). 
270 See Winston Towers, 360 So. 2d at 470-71 ("[T]he amendment to the bylaws was 
void and unenforceable inasmuch as it was an attempt to impose a retroactive regula-
tion."). 
271 See Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 179,182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1975) (upholding a restriction on alcoholic beverages in common areas, noting 
that "restrictions on the use of alcoholic beverages are widespread throughout both 
governmental and private sectors," and that "there is nothing unreasonable or unusu-
al" about such restrictions). 
272 See O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condo. Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813, 815 (Alaska 
1988) (holding that an association had the authority to ban television antennae as 
specified in the Declaration). 
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posing the loss. In this instance, the legal system should-and generally 
does-let the association's decision stand, leaving the dissident owner the 
option of persuading other members to change the course they have fol-
lowed. The same considerations and the same result should apply wheth-
er the issue before the association is the size of the annual assessment, the 
wisdom of a restriction on renting individual units, or the merits of a con-
trol on unit owner lifestyles. 
Three significant exceptions apply. First, when the association's gov-
erning documents expressly limit the association's power to regulate par-
ticular activities, the association may not promulgate rules inconsistent 
with those documents. Second, when the context of dealings between the 
unit owner and association reveals a mutual understanding that the unit 
owner will engage in particular conduct, and when the unit owner relies 
on that understanding, the association is effectively estopped from 
prohibiting the conduct in question. Finally, when the impact of associa-
tion rules does not fall on all unit owners, but instead redistributes value 
from some unit owners to others, the association should not be entitled to 
promulgate the regulation without compensating the adversely affected 
owners. 
CONCLUSION 
Although majority rule has, over the past few centuries, become the 
most acceptable mechanism for making collective decisions, majority rule 
is no panacea. In every setting in which majority rule is the foundation 
for decision making, society has developed legal constraints to protect 
minorities from overreaching by majorities. It would be surprising indeed 
if community associations, which amount to residential private govern-
ments, were an exception. 
At the same time, in virtually every decision making setting, there are 
some built-in protections against majority abuse. And again, community 
associations are no exception. One would expect the legal constraints on 
majority rule to reflect the built-in institutional protections against abuse 
of the minority. And, indeed, protections against minority abuse by gov-
ernment are different from protections against minority abuse by corpo-
rate majorities. Moreover, different corporate settings generate different 
sorts of minority protections. As community association law develops, 
judicial protection against abuses of minorities should increasingly reflect 
the particular institutional setting that surrounds community association 
decisions. 
